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THE PORNOGRAPHIC SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE
John Fee*
ABSTRACT
The secondary effects doctrine has made a muddle of First Amendment
law. The doctrine formally holds that a speech regulation will be treated
as content-neutral if its purpose is to control the secondary effects of
speech, even if it facially discriminates according to speech content. It
pretends to be a general First Amendment doctrine, but in practice it is all
about regulating pornographic expression. This Article aims to re-evaluate
the secondary effects doctrine in a way that is more transparent. Appre-
ciating the functional basis of the secondary effects doctrine is useful for
understanding the doctrine's limitations, as well as for analyzing new
types of regulation that may arguably fall within its scope. It also provides
important lessons for general First Amendment theory, including how
cost-benefit analysis affects the constitutional rules regarding content dis-
crimination and how the purpose of a regulation affects the level of scruti-
ny that courts apply.
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INTRODUCTION
In First Amendment law, a critical distinction exists between speech
regulations that are content-based and those that are content-neutral. Nor-
mally, if a regulation is content-based, it is subject to strict scrutiny and
presumed to be unconstitutional.' If it is content-neutral, a more lenient
intermediate scrutiny applies.' Generally, whether a regulation is content-
based or content-neutral is resolved by looking at the face of it: a regula-
tion is content-based if it legally discriminates between different kinds of
speech on the basis of message, subject matter, words, ideas or images-
treating one class of speech unfavorably in relation to other classes of
speech.'
The secondary effects doctrine is one exception to this usual metho-
dology. It provides that a regulation will be treated as content-neutral and
subject to intermediate scrutiny, despite its content-discriminatory form, if
the primary purpose of the regulation is to control the secondary effects
rather than the primary effects of speech.4 The doctrine applies most
commonly-and indeed, almost exclusively-to justify the selective regula-
tion of pornography and sexual entertainment,5 even though the Supreme
Court has implied that it is a general First Amendment doctrine.
This Article explores the descriptive meaning and lessons of the sec-
ondary effects doctrine. What exactly is a secondary effect? Why is it pre-
1. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) ("It is rare
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.").
2. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
3. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) ("As a general rule, laws
that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed are content based."); see also John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REv.
1103, 1123-24 (2005) (describing the various forms of content discrimination).
4. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002); City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71
n.34 (1976). These three cases are the primary subject of Part I, infra.
5. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
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ferable for government to regulate speech based on its secondary effects
rather than its primary effects? And why do courts seem to believe that
only sexually explicit speech has secondary consequences? Related to these
questions is the larger issue of why content-based regulations are disfa-
vored at all.6
I propose here that the formal secondary effects doctrine is misleading
and even dangerous on its own terms. As applied to most forms of pro-
tected speech, the secondary effects doctrine is both descriptively incohe-
rent and normatively empty. For example, when political speech is con-
cerned, the secondary effects doctrine has no rational place in First
Amendment law. The good news, however, is that courts generally do not
apply the secondary effects doctrine to most forms of protected speech.
The doctrine was created for the regulation of pornography and sexually
oriented entertainment, a type of expression that differs from other speech
in significant ways.
One might conclude from this that the secondary effects doctrine
should be abandoned,7 but that is not the approach of this Article. Much of
society accepts the appropriateness of zoning sexually oriented businesses
for locations where they will cause the least harm to property values, resi-
dential neighborhoods, and nearby commerce, even if this means selec-
tively regulating some constitutionally protected speech based on its con-
tent.8 One need not be morally opposed to pornography or erotic enter-
tainment in order to agree with zoning laws that specifically apply to these
businesses. Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it does not
offend First Amendment values for government regulators to treat sexually
oriented businesses as a distinct category of land use9-just as regulators
treat smoky factories as a distinct category of land use°-provided that
they do not overregulate those constitutionally protected businesses. The
secondary effects doctrine is the law's way of reaching this result.
6. For significant works addressing the role of content discrimination in First Amendment law
see Fee, supra note 3; Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Mo-
tive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and
Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NoTRE DAME'
L. REv. 1347 (2006); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
7. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms," 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55 (1997) (arguing the doctrine should be abolished).
8. Municipal regulations that control the location and operation of sexually oriented business are
common. Typically, a "sexually oriented business" or "adult business" is a formal category of land
use activity defined in a city's zoning ordinance, and subject to unique restrictions. See David A.
Thomas, Tips for Successfully Regulating Sexually Oriented Businesses, PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb.
2008, at 43, 45 (2008).
9. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
10. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 446 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (comparing regulations of sexually oriented businesses to factory pollution regulations for pur-
poses of constitutional analysis).
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Rather than call for the unlikely abandonment of this doctrine, this Ar-
ticle takes the secondary effects doctrine as a given, instead re-evaluating
it as a pornographic speech doctrine. If the results of the secondary effects
doctrine are firmly entrenched, even if the methodology is exceptional or
tortured, then it suggests some important lessons for constitutional law that
this Article explores. First, the secondary effects doctrine shows that por-
nography and sexually oriented entertainment receive a different level of
constitutional protection than core First Amendment speech. Similar to the
law's treatment of commercial speech, the First Amendment treats porno-
graphy as constitutionally protected but subject to its own rules. Indeed,
recognizing the distinctive constitutional status of pornographic speech has
the advantage of preventing the secondary effects doctrine from spilling
into other areas of law, which could erode First Amendment protections
for all forms of speech.
Second, the secondary effects doctrine reveals something deeper about
the constitutional distinction between content-based and content-neutral
laws: the distinction is a means to an end, and that end is to maximize the
potential value of speech for audiences while controlling preventable
harms. The First Amendment does not require either courts or legislatures
to be wholly indifferent to the costs and benefits of various types of
speech, despite occasional statements in judicial opinions to the contrary.
Rather, the secondary effects doctrine indicates that First Amendment
rights are a function of the predicted costs and benefits of different types
of speech in various situations. While the First Amendment does tip the
balancing scale significantly in favor of tolerating speech, requiring even
the toleration of harmful, low-minded speech to a significant extent, it
does not prohibit the balancing process altogether. The First Amendment
does not require society to suffer predictable harms that can be avoided
through reasonable content-based restrictions.
Finally, the secondary effects doctrine shows that a government's pur-
pose for regulating speech is relevant in determining the level of scrutiny
imposed. It also provides a possible explanation as to why. Certain kinds
of regulatory motives, especially those that depend upon deterring or re-
ducing speech, are more likely to produce regulations that are not worth
their risks in terms of their chilling effects on speech. The secondary ef-
fects doctrine thus imposes an "anti-proportionality" principle, which
helps to sort the most dangerous kinds of speech regulations from less
suspicious regulations.
It is time to recognize the secondary effects doctrine in non-formalist
terms for what it does and why it exists. It is time to recognize that the
doctrine is not just coincidentally associated with pornographic speech, but
is all about pornographic speech and its predicted effects in society. The
doctrine is also about the inevitable balancing process that undergirds First
Amendment law. Recognizing this is not a threat to First Amendment in-
[Vol. 60:2:291
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terests, as some may suppose. Rather, it provides a surer basis for under-
standing and developing the rights that we have, and for controlling the
circumstances under which government may regulate speech.
Part I describes the development of the secondary effects doctrine in
its historical context as a response to changes in First Amendment law in
the 1970s. Part II addresses the descriptive question "what is a secondary
effect?" and concludes that courts do not apply the same standard to all
kinds of speech. Part III addresses the normative basis-or lack thereof-
for the distinction. Parts IV and V explore the general lessons of a revised
secondary effects doctrine for pornography regulation and broader First
Amendment application.
I. A PRODUCT OF EXPANDING SPEECH PROTECTION
To appreciate the context in which the Supreme Court invented the
secondary effects doctrine, it is important to understand two developments
in First Amendment law that immediately preceded it. Both developments
strengthened the freedom of speech in opposition to government censor-
ship and significantly changed First Amendment law by imposing see-
mingly clear rules. Yet both created the need for some kind of exceptional
doctrine.
A. The Narrowing of Obscenity Law
The first development was the dramatic revision of the law's definition
of obscenity between 1957 and 1974, which created new constitutional
protection for pornography.11 Prior to the 1960s, a business that specia-
lized in selling explicit pornography could have been regulated or even
shut down for dealing in obscenity. Such businesses were no more pro-
tected by the First Amendment than brothels or gambling houses. Obsceni-
ty has never been protected by the First Amendment, 2 and in earlier times
obscenity included anything that was aimed to appeal to the prurient inter-
est of the average adult. 13 For a period, the law was so broad that disputed
obscenity cases tended to involve mildly racy passages in novels, such as
James Joyce's Ulysses. 14 There was no doubt that explicit material of the
11. I mark this evolution as beginning with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and
ending with Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
12. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
13. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. The obscenity standard used in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries was even broader, covering essentially any work likely to corrupt the weakest members
of society. See FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 8-29 (1976) (describing the history
of obscenity law in the United States prior to Roth).
14. See United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
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type that one might find today in Penthouse or Hustler magazines was
clearly obscene and did not have any constitutional protection.
By the 1970s, however, after a long line of Supreme Court obscenity
cases, the law had evolved in such a way that government could no longer
take it for granted that all pornography, or even all hard-core pornogra-
phy, qualified as obscene. Nor could it assume that nude dancing was ob-
scene. The new test for obscenity announced in Miller v. California5 re-
quired showing not only that a work "appeals to the prurient interest" of
adults according to "contemporary community standards," but also that it
depicts specified sexual conduct "in a patently offensive way," and that it
"lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"-elements
which typically would be proven in jury trials. 6 Moreover, in Jenkins v.
Georgia,"7 the Supreme Court made clear that there is an objective limit to
what a jury may find to be obscene: only depictions of "hard core" sexual
conduct may qualify. Mere nudity, implied sex, or immoral themes cannot
alone qualify a work as obscene. 18
Consequently, this legal change, combined with changed social atti-
tudes towards pornography, made it increasingly difficult for governments
to prosecute obscenity through jury trials. Obscenity prosecutions dropped
off dramatically in the 1970s, 19 and a new category of protected First
Amendment expression arose. This expression included sexually explicit
movies, books, and entertainment that had many of the familiar attributes
of pornography-including an emphasis on explicit sexual acts, a pander-
ing to the sexual interest of the audience, and use of shocking elements.2"
However, these works either were not sufficiently offensive to qualify as
15. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
16. Id. at 24. Although the Miller definition of obscenity was significantly narrower than the Roth
definition, the case was actually a partial victory for anti-obscenity forces and the product of a new
conservative majority on the Supreme Court. The real narrowing of obscenity law had occurred during
the 1960s through a series of per curiam decisions that generally held anything but hard-core porno-
graphy to be constitutionally protected. E.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). Even so,
the Miller standard proved in practice to be advantageous to the pornography industry, especially by
comparison to what the law had been in 1957 and earlier. See Bruce A. Taylor, Hard-Core Pornogra-
phy: A Proposal For a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 255, 256-71 (1987-88) (describing the
difficulties of prosecuting obscenity under the Miller test in the late 1970s and 1980s as contrasted to
earlier times); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 13-14, 341-46 (Rutledge Hill Press 1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON
PORNOGRAPHY] (describing the evolution of obscenity law from a period of broad application to the
modern era, in which even hard-core pornography and sexually oriented businesses are rarely subject
to obscenity prosecution).
17. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
18. Id. at 160-61.
19. See Taylor, supra note 16, at 257; COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 53-55.
20. See Park Elliott Dietz & Alan E. Sears, Pornography and Obscenity Sold in "Adult Books-
tores": A Survey of 5132 Books, Magazines, and Films in Four American Cities, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 7 (1987-88) (detailing the frequency of various explicit and violent elements of pornography
available in stores; although the study took place in the 1980s, it is an indication of where the trend
was headed in the 1970s).
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obscenity under the new test, or at least prosecutors were unwilling to
charge them as obscene. Businesses specializing in pornography and live
sexual entertainment came out of hiding in increasingly large numbers,
creating new concerns for land use planners.21
An implication of this development, though not necessarily intended,
was that this new, legal form of sexually oriented business enjoyed the full
protection of the First Amendment. Because First Amendment law prior to
1976 formally recognized only two categories of expression-protected
and unprotected22 -one could infer that by recognizing some First
Amendment protection for non-obscene pornography, and by narrowing
the definition of obscenity so as to exclude most pornography for practical
purposes, the Supreme Court had raised mainstream pornography to the
same status as political speech, subject to all the same First Amendment
rules. Sexually oriented businesses went from being illegal public nuis-
ances to claiming favored constitutional protection, seemingly equivalent
in their constitutional status to libraries, schools, newspapers, and political
campaigns.
B. A New Emphasis on Content Neutrality
A second development of the early 1970s was the introduction of the
idea that the First Amendment disfavors content discrimination of any type
in laws that regulate speech.23 Prior to the 1970s, the Supreme Court did
not focus on content discrimination in its First Amendment cases. Some
older cases indicate that disagreement with a speaker's viewpoint is not a
valid basis for restricting it,24 but even these cases do not establish a clear
antidiscrimination methodology and do not suggest that other kinds of con-
tent classifications (such as subject matter, word choice, or image classifi-
cations) are unconstitutional or even troubling.25
In an earlier era, rather than focus on content discrimination, the Su-
preme Court generally resolved free speech disputes through a flexible
balancing process. The methodology considered such factors as the extent
21. Id. at 38-41; see also COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 16, at 345-46.
22. The Supreme Court did not recognize commercial speech as having even limited First
Amendment protection until it decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consum-
er Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
23. For an overview of this development, and the trend towards treating the freedom of speech
primarily as an anti-discrimination rule, see Fee, supra note 3, at 1116-22.
24. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969); Nie-
motko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951).
25. At least this suggestion is not made in any majority opinion of the Supreme Court prior to
1970. Justice Black, however, did apply the modern content approach in his concurring opinion in Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 580-81 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), to
which the Supreme Court later cited authoritatively. For a historical account of the Court's treatment
of content and viewpoint discrimination in the early years, see Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amend-
ment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REv. 203, 214-27 (1982).
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of the regulation or punishment, the potential value or harm of the speech,
the government's interest in regulating it, and the general value of free and
open debate on public issues.26 If the balance favored the government in a
given case, the Court upheld the regulation or punishment, even if it was
content-discriminatory. 27 For example, in Rowan v. United States Post
Office Department, the Court upheld a restriction against mailing sexually
explicit material to home recipients who had objected to receiving "'eroti-
cally arousing or sexually provocative"' material. 28 The Court found the
law constitutional because of the overriding interests of homeowners to be
free from offensive speech, 9 while failing even to discuss the regulation's
content-discriminatory form.
Beginning around 1971, however, it became a threshold First
Amendment question to ask whether a regulation of speech is content-
based. Three cases marked the shift. In Cohen v. California, the Supreme
Court reversed a man's conviction for wearing a profanity-inscribed jacket
in public, holding that "governmental bodies may not prescribe the form
or content of individual expression" nor excise offensive words from the
public vocabulary.3" In Police Department v. Mosley, the Court held un-
constitutional a law restricting picketing near schools because it contained
an exception for labor-related picketing, thus violating the "'equality of
status in the field of ideas.' "31 And, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
the Court struck down a city ordinance which banned the showing of mov-
ies with nudity at outdoor theaters visible from public streets, stating that
"when the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield
the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more
offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power. "32
The content-based methodology of Cohen, Mosley, and Erznoznik was
new in several respects. First, it expanded the principle disfavoring view-
point discrimination to cover other kinds of content classifications, includ-
ing words, subject matter, and images. Second, these cases seemed to
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (relying on "the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" to strike a new balance in
the area of defamation law).
27. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a statute prohibiting distri-
bution of pornography to minors because of the interest in protecting minors); Konigsberg v. State Bar
of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961) (upholding a rule disqualifying from state bar membership any person
who had advocated forcible overthrow of the government based on a "weighing of the respective
interests involved"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding the selective
punishment of fighting words upon finding that such utterances are valueless).
28. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 730 (1970) (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a)
(1964 & Supp. IV 1965-1968)).
29. Id. at 736-38.
30. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
31. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).
32. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
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imply that the constitutional rule against content discrimination operated
independently of the degree of burden imposed on speech. Thus, even
small regulatory burdens were presumed unconstitutional if imposed in a
content-discriminatory manner, as in Mosley. Third, the opinions in these
cases suggested that the rule against content discrimination was absolute or
subject only to rare exceptions. A stirring passage from Mosley captures
all three of these ideals:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content .... The essence of ... forbid-
den censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive
activity because of its content would completely undercut the "pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
33
The new rhetoric concerning content discrimination was powerful and
modern. But if taken literally, this methodology would pose problems for
many areas of law and regulation that had never previously been chal-
lenged.34 Sexually oriented businesses were among the first to notice this.
C. The Secondary Effects Doctrine of Young v. American Mini Theatres
The secondary effects doctrine originated with the Supreme Court's
fractured decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.35 Despite the
lack of a majority opinion on the central issue, Young is worth greater
study and emphasis than commentators commonly give it, in part because
it presents two competing versions of the secondary effects doctrine that
continue to cast their shadow over current law.
The Young episode began in 1972, when the City of Detroit amended
its Anti-Skid Row Ordinance to add "adult motion picture theaters,"
"adult mini theaters," and "adult bookstores" to a list of regulated uses
that tended, in the city's judgment, to cause neighborhood decline. 36 Ac-
cording to experts who advised the city, allowing several of these busi-
nesses to concentrate in the same neighborhood "tends to attract an unde-
sirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property val-
ues, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages
33. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
34. For an overview of the many exceptions in the law to this content-neutrality ideal, see Fee,
supra note 3, at 1136-48.
35. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
36. Id. at 54. The Ordinance also applied to cabarets, bars, hotels, motels, pawnshops, pool halls,
secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls. Id. at 52 n.3.
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residents and businesses to move elsewhere."37 The Ordinance therefore
provided that no more than two such businesses could operate within
1,000 feet of one another, nor could any such business operate within 500
feet of a residential area.3"
The problem with the amended Ordinance was that it defined regulated
businesses according to the content of the movies or books that they of-
fered. An "adult" business was one that presented "material distinguished
or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating
to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,"' terms
that the Ordinance further defined in detail.39 The Ordinance plainly dis-
criminated according to speech content and therefore seemed to conflict
with the Court's holding in Mosley. For this reason, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the Ordinance unconstitutional, suggesting that
Detroit tackle the problem of neighborhood decline "'by means of more
carefully drawn and even-handed legislation. "40
The Supreme Court reversed and held the Detroit Ordinance constitu-
tional despite its content-discriminatory form. Justice Stevens wrote a plu-
rality opinion joined by three other Justices, while Justice Powell wrote a
concurring opinion. The plurality and concurring opinions agreed on sev-
eral points that make up the essentials of the modern secondary effects
doctrine. 4' For all Justices in the majority, the Detroit Ordinance was
permissible, despite its content discriminatory form, for three reasons:
The Ordinance was designed to serve interests not directly related to
the suppression of pornography's message. Justice Stevens and Justice
Powell agreed that the Detroit Ordinance's goals of reducing crime and
preventing neighborhood blight distinguished it from cases involving mes-
sage-based censorship. Although the Ordinance singled out sexually expli-
cit speech, Justice Stevens found this permissible because the Ordinance
was designed to control secondary effects associated with this speech, not
its offensive message.42 For similar reasons, Justice Powell found that the
37. Id. at 55 (quotes refer to the Supreme Court's summary of the expert's findings). Detroit had
previouoly maintained such an ordinance without mention of adult businesses, but the rapid increase in
the number of adult businesses operating in Detroit in just a few years prompted it to add them to the
list. Id. at 54, 55 n.8.
38. Id. at 52.
39. Id. at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1021 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 20 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
41. While commentators have sometimes attributed the secondary effects doctrine to Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Young, as contrasted with that of Justice Stevens, both opinions use similar logic and
are consistent with the basic doctrine. Moreover, Justice Stevens's opinion actually contains the phrase
"secondary effect," see Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976), whereas
Justice Powell's does not.
42. Id. ("The Common Council's determination was that a concentration of 'adult' movie theaters
causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to thea-
ters showing other types of films. It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to
avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech.").
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city was justified in regulating adult theaters differently than other theaters
"because they have markedly different effects upon their surroundings. " 43
He warned that if the purpose of the Ordinance had been to curtail the
message of adult theaters, he would have decided differently."
The Ordinance was reasonably designed to serve a substantial go-
vernmental interest. Justices in the majority agreed that the government's
interest in neighborhood preservation was substantial, and found the city's
choice of how to serve that interest through land use regulations accepta-
ble. Justice Stevens stated that the city's interest in preventing neighbor-
hood decline "must be accorded high respect" and that "the city must be
allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admitted-
ly serious problems. 45 In similar language, Justice Powell, applying in-
termediate scrutiny,46 found that there is no "doubt that the interests fur-
thered by this ordinance are both important and substantial. "41
The Ordinance did not significantly impair access to the speech in
question. Justices Stevens and Powell also found it significant that the re-
striction imposed only a modest burden on. the speech of adult businesses.
Since the Ordinance regulated only the location of adult businesses, Justice
Powell predicted that there would be no "significant overall curtailment of
adult movie presentations." 48 Similarly, Justice Stevens characterized the
burden on protected expression as "'slight."' 49 He further stated, "The
situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of sup-
pressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech." 5"
In spite of their agreement on these points, the analyses of Justices
Stevens and Powell differed in two significant ways. First, Justice Stevens
recognized the Detroit Ordinance as content-based,51 whereas Justice Pow-
ell did not. Rather, Justice Powell found the Ordinance to be content-
neutral because its purpose was not to suppress speech.52 This difference
of methodology is less important than it may seem because both the plural-
ity and concurring opinions concluded that the Ordinance was subject to
relaxed scrutiny for similar reasons, including the Ordinance's lack of
43. Id. at 82 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
44. See id. at 81-82 n.4.
45. Id. at 71 (plurality opinion).
46. Justice Powell applied the O'Brien test, see id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring), whereas the
plurality did not make clear what standard it was applying. The plurality's analysis, however, is con-
sistent with intermediate scrutiny and the O'Brien test.
47. Id. at 80.
48. Id. at 79. Indeed, Justice Powell noted that, according to the district court's findings, "if a
sufficient market exists to support them the number of adult movie theaters in Detroit will remain
approximately the same." Id.
49. Id. at 72 n.35 (plurality opinion) (quoting Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp.
363, 370 (E.D. Mich. 1974)).
50. Id. at 71 n.35.
51. See id. at 70-71.
52. See id. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
2009]
Alabama Law Review
ultimate focus on the speech's message. Although Justice Stevens framed
the secondary effects doctrine as an exception to the general rule against
content discrimination, while Justice Powell applied it as part of the defini-
tion of "content-based," it is in effect the same principle stated two differ-
ent ways.
Second, and more substantively, Justice Stevens recognized and gave
constitutional weight to the idea that pornography is a distinctive type of
speech subject to less protection than political speech. He stated:
[I]t is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of ex-
pression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the
interest in untrammeled political debate . . . . [F]ew of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's
right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters
of our choice.53
Justice Stevens thus treated non-obscene pornography as having a dis-
tinctive constitutional status somewhere between fully protected speech
and unprotected speech. He concluded that the State may not ban such
material because of its potential for some artistic value, but "the State may
legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them
in a different classification from other motion pictures.""
By contrast, Justice Powell's concurrence conspicuously made no
judgment about pornography's relative value. Indeed, this was apparently
the issue that prompted Justice Powell to write separately.55 Classifying
some kinds of speech as "low value" for constitutional purposes is a dan-
gerous exercise, for it risks the suppression of speech that the majority of
society does not appreciate.56 Out of cautiousness, Justice Powell seemed
to prefer resting solely on the neighborhood effects rationale.
The irony of this cautiousness, however, is that in some respects it
causes Justice Powell's opinion to be more threatening to the freedom of
speech than Justice Stevens's opinion. Justice Powell's methodology, if
taken to be indifferent to the type of speech that is regulated, poses a
broader conflict with the rule disfavoring content discrimination stated in
Cohen, Mosley, and Erznoznik-a rule that has since become a central
53. Id. at 70 (plurality opinion).
54. Id. at 70-71.
55. See id. at 73 n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion,
objected most strongly to this part of the plurality's analysis, calling it "wholly alien to the First
Amendment." Id. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 337-48
(1995) (discussing critiques of low value speech theory). But see Arnold H. Loewy, The Use, Nonuse,
and Misuse of Low Value Speech, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 195, 199-210 (2001) (discussing how
treating some speech as low value is constitutionally legitimate and can serve First Amendment inter-
ests).
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feature of modern First Amendment analysis.57 Whereas Justice Stevens's
secondary effects doctrine creates at most a pornography exception to the
constitutional rule disfavoring content discrimination, Justice Powell's
version of the doctrine appears to apply to any category of speech regula-
tion. In theory, this could allow even facially discriminatory regulations of
political, religious, or scientific speech as long as the speech causes some
negative societal effects that can be reduced by partially restricting it, such
as by limiting it to certain zones of a city according to its content.
D. The Split Remains: Renton and Alameda Books
More than thirty years after the Supreme Court decided Young, while
cities and counties routinely rely on the secondary effects doctrine to regu-
late sexually oriented businesses, the Supreme Court has not firmly settled
the tension between Justice Stevens's plurality and Justice Powell's con-
curring opinions on either issue that divided them. These issues are: (1)
whether, as a matter of classification, to recognize secondary effects or-
dinances as acceptably content-based or instead to deem them content-
neutral; and (2) whether the secondary effects doctrine is limited to sexual-
ly explicit speech.
The Supreme Court appeared to settle the classification issue in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., wherein a majority of the Court reaf-
firmed the secondary effects doctrine of Young, and applied it as part of
what defines a content-neutral regulation.5" In Renton, the Supreme Court
held that an ordinance controlling the location of adult movie theaters for
the purpose of reducing secondary effects "is completely consistent with
our definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' 59 The
Court then proceeded to apply intermediate scrutiny applicable to content-
neutral regulations.'
More recently, however, this part of the Renton analysis has divided
the Court. In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. ,6 while all nine
Justices agreed that intermediate-level scrutiny is appropriate for ordin-
ances aimed at controlling the secondary effects of adult businesses,62 only
57. See Fee, supra note 3, at 1116-20.
58. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986).
59. Id. at 48 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
60. Id. at 50.
61. 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
62. See id. at 434-42 (plurality opinion) (applying the Renton framework, including its application
of content-neutral scrutiny); id. at 447 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (The ordinance "calls for interme-
diate and not strict scrutiny, as we held in Renton."); id. at 454 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("This ordin-
ance stands or falls on the results of what our cases speak of as intermediate scrutiny .... "); see also
id. at 456 (describing the scrutiny level as "middle-tier").
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Justice O'Connor's plurality applied the full Renton methodology.63 Other
Justices applied something closer to the Stevens methodology from his
opinion in Young. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, described the
Renton classification as a "fiction" that is inconsistent with the Court's
usual method of treating facially discriminatory regulations as content-
based. 6 He concluded, "These ordinances are content based, and we
should call them so."65 Justice Souter added to this, in dissent, and agreed
that to call such a law content-neutral is misleading, suggesting that anoth-
er term such as "content correlated" would be more appropriate.66 He was
joined in this part by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. 67 Thus, at least four
members of the Court seem disinclined to call these ordinances content-
neutral, even if they are ultimately constitutional under a lower standard of
scrutiny.
The significance of this category choice is subtle. An advantage of re-
cognizing these ordinances as content-based-albeit exempt from strict
scrutiny-as Justice Kennedy would do, may be to achieve doctrinal clari-
ty and consistency, thereby preventing a muddying of the content-
based/content-neutral distinction in other areas.68 Moreover, as Justice
Souter suggested, recognizing these ordinances as content-discriminatory
might serve to protect speech, even within a system of intermediate scruti-
ny, by reminding judges that the secondary effects doctrine is not a rubber
stamp. 69 However, there is also a potential pro-regulatory effect of admit-
ting that the secondary effects doctrine is yet another exception to constitu-
tional rules that disfavor content-based regulation. It permits courts and
commentators to more easily observe, as Justice Stevens did in Young, that
there are many forms of content-based regulation that are acceptable, and
that regulating speech on the basis of content, therefore, does not create
such a strong presumption of invalidity as cases sometimes suggest.7" The
more exceptions there are to the presumption disfavoring content-based
regulations, the more this tends to erode the normative force of the pre-
sumption.
The Supreme Court has also left murky the second and larger issue,
which is whether the secondary effects doctrine only applies to sexually
explicit speech. The Court has never upheld a content-discriminatory regu-
63. See id. at 434, 441 (plurality opinion).
64. See id. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 453. Justice Breyer did not join this section of Justice Souter's dissent and did not
express a view on this issue.
68. See id. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-71 (1976) (plurality opinion); see
also Fee, supra note 3, at 1136-49 (arguing that the many exceptions to the constitutional rule disfa-
voring content discrimination should cause us to reevaluate both the strength and meaning of the rule).
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lation on the basis of the secondary effects doctrine that did not concern
sexually explicit speech.71 In Renton, the Court found it sufficient to hold
that the secondary effects doctrine applies "at least with respect to busi-
nesses that purvey sexually explicit materials" and cited Justice Stevens's
statement in Young that pornography has diminished constitutional value.72
At the same time, Renton cited cases involving other kinds of speech for
the general proposition that an ordinance is content-neutral if it is "'justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regulated speech"' and pur-
ported to rely on that general principle.73 In Alameda Books, neither the
plurality nor concurrence relied upon pornography's distinctive constitu-
tional status as justification for the secondary effects doctrine.74
Adding to the confusion, the Supreme Court has sometimes enter-
tained secondary effects arguments with respect to non-sexual speech-
even political speech-and it has never rejected those arguments on the
simple grounds that the doctrine doesn't apply.75 Nevertheless, it has al-
ways found in non-sexual speech cases that the effects in question were not
secondary, thus avoiding the doctrine's effects. What can explain this?
Perhaps only sexually explicit speech produces negative secondary effects,
although this seems doubtful. Or perhaps the Court will someday apply the
doctrine to justify a discriminatory regulation of non-sexual speech once
an appropriate case arises. But there is also good reason to doubt this, as
shown in the next part. To examine these propositions requires closer ex-
amination of the phrase "secondary effect." It appears that the Supreme
Court does not apply this concept consistently to all kinds of speech.
71. Both Renton and Alameda Books involved facially discriminatory regulations of sexually
oriented businesses similar to that in Young. Other Supreme Court cases that are sometimes cited with
Renton and Alameda Books have involved content-neutral speech regulations or expression-neutral
laws of conduct, and therefore, do not depend upon the secondary effects doctrine to avoid strict
scrutiny. For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), the Court cited
Renton to uphold a noise-control regulation as applied to an outdoor musical performance and some-
times this is called a secondary effects case. But importantly, Ward involved a facially content-neutral
noise regulation; the Court's opinion does not even mention the term "secondary effects" and does not
require a special doctrine to avoid strict scrutiny. For similar reasons, neither of the Court's nude
dancing cases, City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560 (1991), necessarily depend upon application of the secondary effects doctrine. In both cases,
the Supreme Court upheld application of general laws prohibiting public nudity against establishments
that wished to violate the law for expressive reasons, and so involved a straightforward application of
the intermediate scrutiny standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See Erie, 529
U.S. at 289-90; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (plurality opinion); id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). While
the Supreme Court's use of the term "secondary effects" in Barnes and Erie reinforces its association
with adult businesses, it was not essential to determine the level of scrutiny.
72. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 & n.2 (1986).
73. Id. at 48-49 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
74. Justice Scalia wrote in a separate concurrence that he would treat "the business of pandering
sex" as entirely unprotected, but he offered this as an alternative rationale to the plurality's secondary
effects analysis, which he joined. 535 U.S. 425, 443-44 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394-95 n.7 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988).
2009]
Alabama Law Review
II. THE DESCRIPTIVE PROBLEM
Let us assume for purposes of this section that the secondary effects
doctrine applies equally to all kinds of speech, as the Supreme Court has
sometimes implied. It holds, as an exception to the usual rules disfavoring
content discrimination, that a facially content-discriminatory regulation of
speech is permissible if its purpose is to control the secondary effects of
the speech and if it passes intermediate scrutiny. To apply this doctrine,
one must know what counts as a secondary effect.
Even taking Supreme Court case law alone, this presents a serious de-
scriptive problem. The Supreme Court has not explained the distinction
between secondary and primary effects clearly or consistently, and there
appears to be no single concept of secondary effects that can reconcile
current law. While there are several possible definitions of secondary ef-
fects that are theoretically available, none of them can explain the various
cases in which the Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny or
strict scrutiny. It appears that the Court employs different conceptions of
secondary effects depending on the kind of speech at issue.
This part will test several possible definitions of secondary effects
against established First Amendment law. The definitions of secondary
effects considered here are: (1) remote in the chain of causation (including
variations based on the speaker's intent or foreseeability); (2) mere corre-
lation; (3) non-communicative causation; and (4) causation independent of
viewpoint.
A. Remote Causation
One straightforward meaning of secondary effect refers to remote or
downstream causation, as the term is sometimes used in labor law.76
Where an action causes a chain of consequences, the first consequence in
the chain is a primary effect while the second and more remote conse-
quences are deemed to be secondary.
Under this framework, the direct communicative effects of speech on
audience members are always primary effects. These include persuasion,
offense, changed social attitudes, changed desires and emotions, and even
sexual arousal. Consistent with this, the Court held in Boos v. Barry that
"[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary ef-
fect'" but rather is a "direct impact."71
76. See, e.g., Enter. Ass'n v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885, 906-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring), rev'd, 429 U.S. 507 (1977) (discussing the problems of distinguishing illegitimate sec-
ondary effects from legitimate ones in labor law).
77. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Whatever 'secondary effects' means, I agree that it cannot include listeners' reactions to speech.").
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By contrast, under this definition, the societal consequences that flow
from those communicative effects are secondary. If a man views porno-
graphy so often that he begins to neglect his family, and if he later be-
comes divorced because of the neglect, the divorce is a secondary effect.
Likewise, if a man attends a nude dance club every day after work, even-
tually changing his attitudes towards women and causing him to speak
offensively to the women in his workplace, this is a secondary effect. In
both of these examples, the impact of speech on its audience is a necessary
part of the chain of causation, but the secondary consequences also depend
upon independent causal factors, such as the audience member's own sub-
sequent choices or the decisions of other people.
While this method of dividing primary and secondary effects is clear
enough, and is perhaps most faithful to the term "secondary," it is not a
method that the Supreme Court usually employs, and for good reason.
This definition of secondary effect would make avoiding strict scrutiny for
content-based regulations far too easy. Almost all speech with harmful
direct effects also has negative downstream consequences that are predict-
able. Indeed, it is typically because of the downstream social consequences
that government officials often wish to regulate dangerous speech. Persua-
sion often leads to action. Offense often leads to a response. Psychological
harm often leads to personal problems, loss of productivity, and loss of
opportunities in other aspects of life. These consequences in turn produce
other injuries to society, including economic and educational problems. If
all downstream consequences of dangerous or negative speech counted as
secondary effects, then many of the classic First Amendment cases, in-
cluding those involving subversive speech,7" offensive speech,79 false
statements, ° and speech harmful to the political process,8 ' for example,
should have been decided under the standard of intermediate scrutiny.
Because government could always look further down the chain of causa-
tion to find a secondary effect for its justification, strict scrutiny would
cease to exist as a meaningful restraint on content-based speech regula-
tions.
So let us try revising this method by introducing speaker-intent or fo-
reseeability as limiting factors. Identifying a consequence as indirect or
secondary could also refer to a lack of intent or foreseeability on the part
of the speaker. Unintended or unforeseeable consequences seem to be less
direct-and more logically classified as secondary-compared to those that
the speaker specifically intends to bring about through communication.
78. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech advocating unlawful action, but not
in a way that constitutes imminent incitement).
79. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (offensive racist message).
80. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation).
81. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (use of corporate wealth to
influence the state referendum process).
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Neither of these revisions to the remoteness test can explain current
law. If the concept of secondary effects includes all downstream conse-
quences that are unintended by the speaker, the definition is still far too
broad. Often speakers do not intend the negative downstream conse-
quences of their speech. For example, pornography producers do not gen-
erally intend to affect the rates of divorce or sexual harassment, even if
their speech happens to have such an influence.82 There are many First
Amendment cases that would have been decided differently if the fact that
a speaker does not intend the downstream negative consequences of his
speech means that the government can impose discriminatory regulations
against such speech under intermediate scrutiny as a means of curtailing
such effects. Clearly, the secondary effects doctrine must be narrower
than this.
The opposite problem arises if we add an unforeseeability element to
the test. This would wipe out the secondary effects doctrine. If secondary
effects include only those effects that are not reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the speech, this calls into question the classic secondary effects
cases, including Young, Renton, and Alameda Books. In each of these cas-
es, the harm to neighborhoods from adult businesses was foreseeable and
supported by studies,' 4 and yet the Supreme Court treated these effects as
secondary effects. If the secondary harms had not been predictable, these
laws should have failed under intermediate scrutiny as being irrational.
B. Mere Correlation
If remote causation is not the test, then suppose that a secondary effect
is one that is merely correlated with the speech content in question. Ac-
cording to another potential framework, if speech's effect on its audience
is a necessary part of the chain of causation leading to the effect in ques-
tion, the latter is not a secondary effect. All of the downstream conse-
quences of primary effects remain primary effects. Secondary effects,
therefore, are not caused, even indirectly, by the speech content in ques-
tion; they are merely correlated with it.
82. See generally Jill C. Manning, The Impact of Internet Pornography on Marriage and the
Family: A Review of the Research, 13 SEXUAL ADDICTION & COMPULSIVITY 131 (2006) (presenting
broad-sweeping findings on pornography's effect on society, including rates of divorce and sexual
harassment).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (holding uncons-
titutional as content-discriminatory a rule imposed on adult cable television channels for the purpose of
avoiding bleed-between stations, even though there was no indication that the adult stations intentional-
ly caused bleed); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (holding unconstitu-
tional a parade fee based on the anticipated security costs, even though there was no indication that the
parade organizers intended to impose security costs on the government).
84. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 430 (2002); City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 55
(1976).
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The Supreme Court implied this framework in R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul, where it found unconstitutional a city ordinance imposing extra pe-
nalties for violent crimes that convey a racist message.85 The Court held
that even if racist hate crimes are more likely to cause violent responses
than comparable non-racist crimes, the resulting violence would not count
as a secondary effect:
The only reason why such expressive conduct would be especially
correlated with violence is that it conveys a particularly odious
message; because the "chain of causation" thus necessarily "run[s]
through the persuasive effect of the expressive component" of the
conduct, it is clear that the St. Paul ordinance regulates on the ba-
sis of the "primary" effect of the speech-i.e., its persuasive (or
repellant) force.8 6
Further supporting the correlation/causation distinction, a plurality of
the Court wrote in Boos v. Barry that secondary effects regulations "apply
to a particular category of speech because the regulatory targets happen to
be associated with that type of speech" but "the justifications for regula-
tion have nothing to do with content."87 The phrases "happen to be asso-
ciated with" and "nothing to do with content" imply that secondary effects
exist where there is a mere correlation, but no causal relationship, between
the content of speech and ultimate harm.88
Of course, it is entirely plausible that some neighborhood effects asso-
ciated with particular kinds of speech are merely correlated. For example,
it is possible that sexually oriented businesses tend to locate disproportio-
nately in high-crime neighborhoods for business reasons of their own
without making the crime any worse, leading to a correlation between
such businesses and neighborhood crime. If this is what explains the rela-
tionship between adult businesses and neighborhood conditions, then the
phrases "happen to be associated" and "nothing to do with content" are
accurate.
The problem with the "mere correlation" standard, however, is that it
fails to justify the Court's use of the secondary effects doctrine in Young,
Renton, and Alameda Books. The theory of regulation in all three of these
cases was, and must have been, that the sale of sexually explicit speech at
least sometimes causes negative secondary effects, or there would have
85. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
86. Id. at 394-95 n.7 (1992) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 586 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)).
87. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988).
88. Cf. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 457 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(calling permissible adult business ordinances "content correlated," implying that content-based causa-
tion is absent).
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been no rational basis for targeting only businesses that sell such speech as
the means of combating negative conditions.89 If the presence of businesses
that offer pornography or nude dancers is merely correlated with high
neighborhood crime rates, then removing or relocating them would do
nothing to reduce such crime. Any regulation of speech as a means of
combating its secondary effects would by definition be irrational. Mere
correlation, therefore, also fails to explain the secondary effects doctrine.
C. Non-Communicative Causation
An alternative way to interpret the doctrine is to distinguish between
two types of causation: communicative and non-communicative. Let us
suppose that all communicative effects and their downstream consequences
are classified as primary, whereas all non-communicative effects and their
consequences-such as would exist even if we changed the content of the
speech in question-would count as secondary. For example, a bookstore
specializing in violent white supremacist literature might have an effect of
increasing the risk of violence in a city, which could hurt the commerce of
the city; it might have another effect of causing flood problems for the
city, because it occupies a space that would otherwise serve as a flood
drainage area. The first would count as a primary effect, while the second
would count as secondary because it is causally unrelated to the speech's
message or content.
This distinction finds support in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
in Alameda Books, where he described secondary effects as non-
communicative effects:
Speech can also cause secondary effects . . . unrelated to the im-
pact of the speech on its audience. A newspaper factory may cause
pollution, and a billboard may obstruct a view. These secondary
consequences are not always immune from regulation by zoning
laws even though they are produced by speech.'
It is true that the mere presence of speech-related materials can cause
negative effects wholly apart from whether the materials happen to com-
municate something. A leaflet can become litter even if it is blank. This
89. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 436-41 (plurality opinion) (concluding that the city's evi-
dence was adequate to support a finding that concentrated adult businesses cause negative secondary
effects); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000) (ordinance targeted negative secondary
effects due to presence of nude dancing establishment); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
584 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) ("It ... is no leap to say that live nude dancing of the sort at issue
here is likely to produce the same pernicious secondary effects as the adult films ... at issue in Ren-
ton."); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (ordinance aimed at "sec-
ondary effects caused by the presence of even one such theater in a given neighborhood").
90. Alameda Brooks, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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distinction also correlates nicely with the First Amendment's intuitive con-
cern with content discrimination: a business should not be exempt from
laws of general applicability merely because it deals in expressive materi-
al, but it also generally should not be subject to special burdens on account
of what its material expresses.
Nevertheless, this framework can only partly explain the secondary ef-
fects cases. It more easily explains secondary effects cases involving fa-
cially content-neutral or expression-neutral laws. This includes the nude
dancing cases." In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.92 and City of Erie v.
Pap's A.M. , the Court upheld the application of laws prohibiting "public
nudity" to erotic dancers. In both cases, the government refused to grant
an exemption for dancers, citing concerns that such an exemption would
cause neighborhood crime. If the government rationally believed that the
presence of public nudity in these settings would cause neighborhood
crime apart from whether the nudity is expressive (and regardless of the
message expressed),94 then the effects could qualify as secondary under
this framework. In fact, as the Court's opinions note, the cities in both
cases confirmed that their concerns were unrelated to communicative cau-
sation by prohibiting all public nudity regardless of expressiveness.95
Even if some cases fit the doctrine, however, this framework cannot
explain cases that use the secondary effects doctrine to justify facially con-
tent-discriminatory laws affecting sexually oriented theaters and books-
tores-namely Young, Renton, and Alameda Books. In all three cases, the
government singled out sexually explicit movies and literature for regula-
tion as a means of combating negative neighborhood effects, which the
Supreme Court found to be rational because other types of speech do not
cause those kinds of negative neighborhood effects.' This is inconsistent
with a communication-neutral theory of causation. There could have been
no rational reason to regulate differently theaters that show sexually expli-
cit works unless the content and communication of sexually explicit films
was thought to be part of the chain of causation leading to negative neigh-
91. As explained in note 71, supra, the nude dancing cases do not require application of the sec-
ondary effects doctrine to avoid strict scrutiny in the same way as Young, Renton, or Alameda Books,
because they involved generally applicable laws of conduct, although both cases include a discussion
of secondary effects.
92. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
93. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
94. If this theory of non-communicative causation is implausible, as readers may well conclude,
then the nude dancing cases are also inconsistent with this version of the secondary effects doctrine. I
consider it here because some of the Justices rely on it, see, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 585-86 (Souter,
J., concurring), and it is the only way to potentially reconcile these cases with the non-communicative
definition of secondary effects.
95. Erie, 529 U.S. at 290; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566, 570 (plurality opinion); id. at 576 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
96. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (plurality opi-
nion); id. at 82 (Powell, J., concurring).
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borhood effects. Either the government's regulations were irrational for
singling out one kind of speech according to what it communicates, or
they were designed to curtail negative effects that were somehow causally
related to communication.
Justice Kennedy's examples of other kinds of secondary effects-a
newspaper factory that emits pollution and a billboard that blocks a view-
demonstrate the point. If these effects are secondary because they are "un-
related to the impact of the speech on its audience,"97 a proper regulatory
response would be content-neutral in form as well as in purpose. A valid
regulation of printing press pollution need not regulate business-related
newspapers according to one set of emissions rules and politics-related
newspapers to a different set of emissions rules. Likewise, a restriction on
the placement of billboards for the purpose of protecting scenery should
not vary according to the message of the billboard. But Young, Renton,
and Alameda Books hold that it is rational to single out businesses that
specialize in sexually explicit speech as a means of controlling secondary
effects. How so?
There is no escaping the conclusion that the holdings of Young, Ren-
ton, and Alameda Books depend upon there being some kind of causal
connection between the communicative effects of sexually explicit speech
and negative neighborhood effects. This does not mean that the theory of
causation must be direct or simple, as in the theory that pornography im-
mediately incites its audience to go out and commit crimes in the same
neighborhood where it is purchased. That is only one of several theories
whereby the communicative content of sexually explicit speech could
cause negative neighborhood effects in areas that surround adult business-
es.
Another causal theory is based on the idea of community distaste. It is
plausible that many members of the public are disgusted by pornography
or nude dancing, causing them as consumers and homebuyers to avoid
locations that purvey such speech. If this effect is pronounced enough, it
could cause property values for residential and commercial property to be
lower in the vicinity of adult businesses, which in turn could contribute to
neighborhood crime and blight. If this is the cause, however, these should
all count as primary effects of the speech in question because the offen-
siveness of the speech's content is part of the chain of causation."8
Another theory is based on customer demographics. Perhaps the cus-
tomers of adult businesses are more likely than average members of the
97. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
98. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394-95 n.7 (1992) (an effect is not secondary
if the "repellant force" of the speech forms part of the chain of causation); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 321 (1988) (rejecting a rule against offensive messages directed against embassies, stating, "The
emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect.'").
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public to have an interest in illegal drugs or prostitution,' and drug deal-
ers and prostitutes know this. This demographic of potential customers is
attracted to the location of an adult business because they find the content
of pornography appealing. Then drug dealers and prostitutes respond by
visiting the location more often themselves, and soon the location becomes
a known gathering place for crime. By this chain of causation, the sexually
explicit content of materials offered by an adult business could contribute
to neighborhood deterioration because of its communicative effect on a
target audience." Change the content of the material to something else,
and the audience would change, causing the effects to diminish.
Or perhaps it is some combination of all of the above-pornography's
inciting effect for some, its repulsive effect for others, and its luring effect
to still others that may cause neighborhoods to change in a negative way
when an adult business appears. This only confirms that these are commu-
nicative effects. Take the communicative elements of pornography away,
and the secondary effects would not exist, at least not in a way that is uni-
quely caused by adult businesses. This can explain why the government
might rationally single out such businesses for special regulatory treat-
ment, even if it has no moral objection to pornography. But it also dis-
proves the "no communicative causation" definition of secondary effects.
In Young, Renton, and Alameda Books, there is no plausible theory of
causation that can (a) justify special regulatory treatment of adult business-
es based on the content of their works, and (b) that does not depend on the
communicative effect of sexually explicit works on some audience.
D. Causation Independent of Viewpoint
A final possible definition distinguishes between two kinds of commu-
nicative causation: viewpoint-related causation and viewpoint-neutral cau-
sation. Under this defimition, a secondary effect is one that is causally un-
related to the viewpoint of the speaker. So if audience persuasion or of-
fense at the speaker's viewpoint is part of the chain of causation, then the
ensuing effects are all primary effects. But if the only communicative ef-
fects in the chain of causation involve abstract or imaginative communica-
tion (as in the communication of a sexual fantasy), then the resulting ef-
fects are secondary.
99. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 583-87 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)
(speculating a similar theory of causation, based on the predispositions of adult business consumers).
100. Some might argue that the fantasy-inducing and sexually stimulating effect of pornography for
its audience is not a communicative effect of a type that the First Amendment should recognize. But
this argument also cannot reconcile current law because it would make most pornography unprotected
by the First Amendment. While the precise communicative impact of pornography can vary depending
on the material and audience, something about it must be communicative for it to count as speech, and
whatever that communicative element is will relate to the audience it attracts.
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This definition of secondary effect finds support in Supreme Court
cases holding that viewpoint discrimination is the worst form of content
discrimination under the First Amendment.10' It is also consistent with one
part of the Court's description in Renton for why the city's adult business
ordinance was subject to intermediate scrutiny:
The ordinance does not contravene the fundamental principle that
underlies our concern about "content-based" speech regulations:
that "government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to
express less favored or more controversial views. "102
According to this framework, the neighborhood effects of adult busi-
nesses are secondary because they are not caused by the expression of any
particular viewpoint, even though they flow from pornography's broader
communicative effects. Indeed, pornography does not typically express
any concrete viewpoint (although it may be used to do so), but rather, is
characterized by its sexual explicitness." 3 This framework also explains
why the Supreme Court did not apply the secondary effects doctrine in
R.A.V. or Boos, both of which involved the consequences of viewpoint-
based offenses. To regulate racist hate speech for the purpose of prevent-
ing violence, as in R.A.V., or to regulate speech critical of foreign gov-
ernments for the purpose of protecting diplomatic relations, as in Boos,
would be to target effects that would not exist but for the speaker's ex-
pression of a viewpoint and the audience's appreciation of that view-
point. "0 These were, therefore, properly treated as primary effects.
The problem with this methodology, however, is that it effectively re-
duces the definition of "content-based regulation" to cover little more than
viewpoint discrimination.0 5 In so doing, it contradicts Cohen, Mosley,
101. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995);
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
102. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (quoting Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
103. In saying this, I acknowledge, as many others have shown, that pornography tends to portray
women as objects of abuse, and that it affects readers' attitudes towards women. But it is another
matter to say that this is what defines pornography, or that the purpose of the speech is to influence
readers' attitudes about gender roles. At least the ordinances in Renton and Young do not define
"adult" speech according to its gender message, and do not aim at the gender effects of pornography.
104. See also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) (holding that
parade fees based on the government's anticipated costs of security are not content-neutral because of
the causal relationship between security expenses and the speaker's viewpoint).
105. The definition does not make viewpoint-neutrality and content-neutrality entirely synonymous,
because it is possible for some laws to restrict all viewpoints of a given topic equally and yet still aim
at the viewpoint-related effects of speech. E.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75
(2002) (applying strict scrutiny to a law prohibiting judicial candidates from expressing their views on
certain topics); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1980) (applying
strict scrutiny to a law prohibiting utilities from expressing views on controversial topics in bill in-
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Erznoznik,'" and other more recent cases holding that a content-
discriminatory regulation requires strict scrutiny even if it does not single
out a particular viewpoint, and even if the government's motives are unre-
lated to viewpoint. For example, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
the New York State Crime Victims Board, the Court held unconstitutional
under strict scrutiny a law requiring authors of works describing their own
crimes to share their book royalties with crime victims." Under the defi-
nition of secondary effects suggested here, however, the law should have
been reviewed under intermediate scrutiny because the government was
concerned with the effects of allowing criminals to profit from their
wrongful acts-a concern that does not depend upon the expression of a
viewpoint. For similar reasons, the Supreme Court's cases involving the
regulation of internet pornography,' cable television pornography," 9 and
telephone pornography"' all should have been decided under intermediate
scrutiny. The government's primary interest in all of these cases was to
prevent harm to minors from viewing sexually explicit material, which
does not depend upon any viewpoint, and therefore should have been
treated as a secondary effect. This framework, therefore, also fails to re-
concile current law.
To summarize, the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases do not fit
any plausible meaning of secondary effects if that phrase refers to a type
of causal relationship. While various conceptions of secondary effects are
implied in Supreme Court cases, no one of them can predict when the
Court will apply the secondary effects doctrine or, alternatively, when it
will apply strict scrutiny.
Perhaps this conclusion should be expected, given that the Court has
not even consistently applied the distinction between content-based and
content-neutral regulations outside the scope of the secondary effects doc-
trine. For example, at times it has applied the narrow definition of con-
tent-based regulation suggested in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, which
looks primarily at whether the government disagrees with the speaker's
serts).
106. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. None of these cases involved government
interests related to unfavorable viewpoints, but rather concerned offense at profane words, offense at
nude images, and disruptive effects of picketing.
107. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Rd., 502 U.S. 105,
115-23 (1991). These laws aim at the primary effects of speech under this framework, even though
they are technically viewpoint neutral.
108. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (applying strict scrutiny to the Child Online
Protection Act); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the Communications
Decency Act).
109. See United States v. Playboy Entmn't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (holding unconstitu-
tional an anti-bleed rule applied to adult cable television channels).
110. See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a
restriction on dial-a-porn services).
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message."' At other times, it has applied the more formal and broader
definition from Mosley and Simon & Schuster, which encompasses formal
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint, subject, words, or imagery.
Sometimes the Court even asks the more nebulous question of whether
"official suppression of ideas is afoot." 112 Given this lack of clarity, it
might be unreasonable to expect that the Supreme Court would apply the
secondary effects doctrine consistently when it operates as an exception to
(or sometimes as an application of) such a flexible principle as the First
Amendment's aversion to content discrimination.
Nevertheless, if the term secondary effects gives the illusion that the
Supreme Court has been assigning speech regulations to strict or interme-
diate scrutiny according to some neutral principle, that illusion should be
dispelled. The Supreme Court appears to be choosing what is meant by
secondary effect not according to principles of causation as the term im-
plies, but rather according to broader contextual factors, including the
nature of the speech at issue. Perhaps the term secondary effect is conve-
nient only because it is capable of more than one meaning while appearing
to be objective, and can therefore easily mask a subjective balancing
process.
III. THE NORMATIVE PROBLEM
Besides its descriptive failure, the secondary effects doctrine suffers
from an even more fundamental problem. There appears to be no good
constitutional reason why it should matter whether the effects that gov-
ernment seeks to prevent are secondary or primary in relation to the regu-
lated speech.
In this part, let us assume that the distinction between primary and
secondary effects is clear enough to apply, and that the distinction has to
do with the type of causation involved. Without committing to a precise
definition of primary and secondary effects, assume that primary effects
are more direct or immediate in the chain of causation, are more often
intended by the speaker, and are more often causally related to the view-
point of the speaker. By contrast, secondary effects are more likely indi-
rect or remote in the chain of causation, are more often unintended by the
speaker, and are more often unconnected to any particular viewpoint that
111. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys."); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000)
(applying the Ward standard).
112. See, e.g., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381-82 (2007) (holding that
content discrimination affecting non-entitlements is permissible where "'there is no realistic possibility
that official suppression of ideas is afoot'" (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390
(1992))).
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the speaker expresses. With these assumptions in mind, it is useful to ask
why it should matter for constitutional purposes whether a regulation is
aimed at the primary or secondary effects of speech.
To illustrate the problem, suppose that there are two kinds of speech,
Speech A and Speech B, that are so closely related that they have cross-
over secondary effects. Both types of speech cause increased crime rates
for two types of crime, Crime A and Crime B, that are harmful to society.
The government knows that Speech A has the primary effect of causing
more people to commit Crime A, but it also has the secondary effect of
causing more people to commit Crime B. Likewise, the government
knows that Speech B has the primary effect of causing more people to
commit Crime B, but it also has the secondary effect of causing more
people to commit Crime A.
The secondary effects doctrine rests upon a premise that it is far more
preferable for the government to regulate Speech A for the purpose of
preventing Crime B (its secondary effect), rather than to prevent Crime A
(its primary effect). Conversely, it is preferable for the government to
regulate Speech B for the purpose of preventing Crime Type A (its sec-
ondary effect) rather than to prevent Crime Type B (its primary effect).
Why should this be so? To explore this, it is useful to consider those theo-
ries that scholars have commonly offered for why the freedom of speech
exists and why content-based regulations are dangerous.
A. Audience- and Speaker-Based Theories
One group of normative theories supporting the freedom of speech in-
cludes all those that aim to preserve the value of speech for audiences, and
by extension for society.' 13 These theories include the role of free speech
in facilitating the search for truth and knowledge,114 in facilitating self-
government,"' in checking abusive government,"' and in developing art
and culture. This group of theories encompasses the presumption that the
marketplace of ideas is generally a better judge of speech's truth and value
for society than is the government.1
7
113. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966)
(exploring various normative theories for protecting free speech); EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 29-41 (2d ed. 2005) (organizing various policy arguments for
free speech protection with supporting quotations).
114. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Anendment Justifica-
tion, 30 GA. L. REv. 1 (1995).
115. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
20-35 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment protects only speech that is explicitly aimed at fur-
thering self-government).
116. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521 (1977).
117. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Because all audience-based theories are concerned with the effects of
suppressing too much speech rather than the government's reasons for
suppressing the speech, they appear on the surface to provide no support
for the secondary effects/primary effects distinction. If Speech A has po-
tential value for society, that value is threatened by regulation whether the
government's purpose is to prevent Crime A (its primary effect) or to pre-
vent Crime B (its secondary effect).
One might try to explain the secondary effects doctrine by supposing
that regulations of secondary effects are, on average, less likely to cause
significant suppression of valuable speech than regulations of primary ef-
fects. It is not clear why this would be so, or that this would warrant dif-
fering standards even if it were true to some degree. Certainly it is possi-
ble for secondary-effects-type reasoning to support even the total suppres-
sion of some kinds of speech that produce harmful secondary effects.' 18
Under current law, government cannot entirely ban protected speech for
the purpose of controlling secondary effects because intermediate scrutiny
requires government to leave protected speech "reasonable alternative
avenues of communication."19 If this standard adequately protects
speech's value when government aims at preventing harmful secondary
effects, it should also be adequate protection when government aims at
preventing harmful primary effects. Or, if it is not adequate protection
against regulations aimed at primary effects, we should not consider it
adequate protection against regulations aimed at secondary effects.
One might alternatively argue that the circumstances in which gov-
ernment has reason to regulate speech based on secondary effects are few-
er than the circumstances in which it has reason to regulate speech based
on primary effects. Thus, the aggregate effect of secondary-effects-based
regulations may be less likely to do serious damage to the marketplace of
ideas than the aggregate effect of primary-effects-based regulations. This
might be true, but it is not a principled reason to distinguish between pri-
mary and secondary effects for constitutional purposes. One might just as
well observe that the suppression of Sunday newspapers is less harmful on
the whole than the equivalent suppression of weekday newspapers, be-
cause the former will only be suppressed once a week. What should matter
for constitutional purposes is not the aggregate effect of the whole catego-
ry, but whether regulations of one type are more likely than regulations of
another type to produce outcomes contrary to the public interest. If gov-
ernment tends generally to overregulate speech when it aims at negative
118. For example, if exploitation or prostitution of models by those who produce pornography is a
secondary effect of pornography, almost any suppression of pornography up to the point of total sup-
pression would likely advance the government's interest in preventing that effect. It is through similar
reasoning that the Supreme Court has held that government may ban child pornography. See New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
119. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986).
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primary effects-because it does not appreciate the speech's value or over-
estimates its harm-it is probably just as likely to overregulate speech
when it aims at negative secondary effects. Government might even be
more likely to overregulate based on secondary effects because the causal
connection between speech and harm is more remote, and therefore more
prone to overestimation.
This analysis does not mean that audience-based theories are indiffe-
rent to whether regulations are content-neutral or content-based. There are
several possible theories within an audience-based framework for the First
Amendment's general aversion to content-based regulations. One theory is
that content-based regulations-especially viewpoint-based regulations-
tend to distort the marketplace of ideas, allowing one side of a public de-
bate to dominate the other.120 This could lower the chances that truth will
emerge from the competitive and deliberative process that the First
Amendment is designed to protect. Another theory suggests that content-
based regulations are more often supported by insubstantial governmental
interests, as evidenced by the fact that the government was not willing to
impose the same regulation on speech that it favors."' 1 The constitutional
requirement of content-neutrality, therefore, serves as an aid to judicial
review and discourages governments from regulating speech-even in
small ways-except in circumstances where it has sufficient reason to re-
gulate all speech according to the same rules.122 Another theory notices
that it is politically easier for government to get away with significantly
suppressing some types of speech if it can impose content-discriminatory
regulations; so the rule against discriminatory regulations is designed to
make this kind of suppression less likely for the benefit of audiences.123
Even if one accepts all of these reasons for disfavoring content-based
regulations, they do not support the secondary effects doctrine. All three
of these theories focus on dangers to the marketplace of ideas that are in-
herent in the form of content-based regulations. These dangers do not di-
minish if one changes the government's underlying purpose from one of
primary-effects prevention to one of secondary-effects prevention. For all
we know, government is just as likely to distort public debate, to regulate
for insubstantial reasons, and to oversuppress speech when it singles out
Speech A for discriminatory regulation to prevent Crime B as it is when it
regulates the same speech to prevent Crime A.
120. See Stone, supra note 6, at 217-27.
121. See Fee, supra note 3, at 1157-66.
122. See id.
123. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Con-
duct, "Situation-Altering Utterances, " and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277, 1305-06
(2005).
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The same conclusion holds if we apply a speaker-based framework, or
in other words, the self-realization value of the First Amendment. 124 This
theory emphasizes that people should be free to find self-fulfillment in
expression wholly apart from whether the expression has value to others.
Like the audience-focused framework, however, this also fails to support
the secondary effects doctrine for a simple reason: if speakers find signifi-
cant fulfillment in a particular type of speech (Speech A), and if govern-
ment substantially limits that expression through regulation, the loss of
self-fulfillment is precisely the same whether the government regulates for
the purpose of controlling secondary effects (Crime B) or primary effects
(Crime A). The government's motivation for regulating speech is irrele-
vant to the self-realization value of the First Amendment. 
125
B. Motive-Based Theories
In contrast to audience-based and speaker-based theories, another
framework focuses on avoiding impermissible governmental motives.
Scholars who support this framework argue that it is inherently wrong for
government to regulate speech with certain purposes in mind, no matter
what the effect on the marketplace of ideas, and even if it would be per-
missible for the government to regulate the same speech for different rea-
sons. 1 26 Although these theories appear on the surface to come closer to
explaining the secondary effects/primary effects distinction, they also can-
not do so.
Let us begin with the impermissible motive theory, described most
thoroughly by Elena Kagan.'27 The theory posits that it is inherently wrong
for the government to regulate speech for certain wrongful purposes, in-
cluding to prevent audiences from being persuaded by speech, or to pre-
vent audiences from taking offense at speech, or to serve the self-interest
of government officials.' 28 But since it is impractical for courts to inquire
124. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982) (arguing
that freedom of speech ultimately only serves one value: self-fulfillment of authors and speakers).
125. It is notable that Martin Redish, a leading proponent of the self-realization theory of the First
Amendment, does not accept the content-neutral/content-based distinction as legitimate. See Martin H.
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113, 128 (1981)
("The most puzzling aspect of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions is
that either restriction reduces the sum total of information or opinion disseminated.").
126. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 6; Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 767 (2001); see also Stone, supra note 6, at 227-33.
127. See Kagan, supra note 6; see also Stone, supra note 6, at 227-33.
128. See Stone, supra note 6, at 228. For a discussion of the limitations of these premises as guid-
ing constitutional values, see Fee, supra note 3, at 1152-56. The basic problem is that these principles
do not apply to all areas of government activity or even to all areas of speech regulation, and therefore
are at best only second-order constitutional values. They do not avoid the need for an outside norma-
tive framework (most plausibly an effects-based framework) to explain why certain governmental
motives are impermissible only when coupled with certain means of governmental action.
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directly into the motives of government officials when examining the con-
stitutionality of a regulation, the First Amendment requires strict scrutiny
for those kinds of regulations that are most likely to have been influenced
by hidden improper motives, even where there is no evidence of improper
motive in the individual case. 1
29
As Dean Kagan herself explains, however, this theory seems to un-
dermine rather than support the secondary effects doctrine, because unlike
other areas of First Amendment law that apply strict scrutiny because a
government's claim of legitimate purpose cannot be trusted, the secondary
effects doctrine takes a government's claim of permissible motive at face
value.130 Even though one can justify adult business ordinances by refer-
ence to permissible motives, it is likely that society's offense at pornogra-
phy also influences the degree to which government officials are willing to
regulate such businesses, even if officials do not say so openly. So under
the hidden impermissible motive theory, for example, regulations that
zone adult bookstores less favorably than other types of bookstores are
precisely the kind of regulation that First Amendment law should subject
to strict scrutiny. 131
More fundamentally, however, the secondary effects doctrine does not
work as if it is designed to prohibit any particular governmental purpose
from influencing regulation. As shown by the primary example of this
part, 132 the results of the secondary effects doctrine do not differ simply
according to the government's ultimate purpose. Rather, the doctrine only
discourages the government from using certain means to accomplish cer-
tain ends. If the government's ultimate purpose is to reduce Crime A, the
secondary effects doctrine suggests that it is allowed for the government to
ain for that result by regulating Speech B-where the causal relationship
is secondary-but that it is wrong for the government to aim for that result
by regulating Speech A-where the causal relationship is primary. Re-
markably, there is no difference in the government's ultimate motive in
these two actions, but only a difference of means. This suggests that the
secondary effects doctrine does not rest on a theory of impermissible mo-
tive at all-at least not one based on ultimate motive. If the government's
desire to prevent Crime A is legitimate, then only a theory concerned with
the effects of regulation for audiences or speakers can explain why certain
means of accomplishing that goal are constitutional while other means are
not.
129. See Kagan, supra note 6, at 438-42.
130. See id. at 484-85 ("The secondary effects doctrine . . . seems to run counter to-and thereby
negate the effect of-all the indirect techniques for flushing out illicit purpose that the Court has devel-
oped.").
131. See id. at 484-85.
132. See supra pp. 316-317.
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So, if the secondary effects doctrine rests on a theory that certain go-
vernmental motives are impermissible, it must be that the motives it aims
to avoid are defined in terms of process or causation, not in terms of the
ultimate policies that a government seeks to further. For example, if we
posit that it is inherently wrong as a matter of constitutional law for gov-
ernments to regulate speech with a "motive" of combating the direct,
viewpoint-related consequences of speech, but that it is not wrong for the
government to regulate with a "motive" of combating the indirect conse-
quences of speech, this proposition supports the secondary effects doctrine
perfectly. The problem with this is that it entirely begs the question that it
seeks to answer. It is not a normative theory so much as it is a restatement
of the secondary effects doctrine. Its usefulness as a guiding normative
theory collapses when we ask: Why should we regard the first motive as
impermissible?
Indeed, the proposition that it is inherently wrong for governments to
regulate with a motive of reducing the direct, viewpoint-related conse-
quences of speech is highly questionable as a first principle of govern-
ment. To prefer government regulations of speech based on remote, indi-
rect consequences rather than immediate, direct consequences seems
backwards when compared to established First Amendment law in the area
of incitement. Under Brandenburg v. Ohio, it is permissible for the gov-
ernment to punish a person's words as incitement only if those words are
"directed to inciting ... imminent lawless action and [are] likely to . . .
produce such action." 33 Thus, the government may punish a person for
saying, "Kill him now" while standing next to a gunman, but it may not
punish a person for preaching dangerous ideas that are likely in the long
run to cause some people to commit murder. Under incitement law, the
more direct and immediate the causal connection, the more likely it is al-
lowed for the government to prohibit words because of their effects.
Incitement law's preference for direct, immediate causal connections
makes sense for several reasons. The risk of government error and over-
regulation is lower when the speech's harm is quite certain, and harm is
generally easier to predict when it is imminent. Moreover, where there is
likely to be a significant time delay-like months or years-between the
moment someone utters dangerous words and the unlawful conduct that
those words inspire, it is more likely that government can reduce the prob-
lem through education and persuasion. Finally, the punishment of abstract
advocacy that is only remotely connected to potential unlawful conduct is
far more likely to chill valuable political speech than the mere punishment
of direct and imminent incitement. For all these reasons, the requirement
133. Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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that there be a close and direct causal connection between speech and
harm in incitement cases is reasonable.
By contrast, the secondary effects doctrine's apparent preference for
regulating speech only to avoid remote, indirect consequences seems to
have nothing but say-so to support it.
IV. LESSONS OF A SEXUALLY ORIENTED SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE
The previous two parts have shown that the formal version of the sec-
ondary effects doctrine is incoherent as a description of current law and is
not justified by leading policy theories of the First Amendment. The doc-
trine purports to be a neutral constitutional principle that favors regulation
of remote and indirect consequences of speech as opposed to immediate
and direct consequences. But the secondary effects doctrine that courts
apply has almost nothing to do with the term secondary in this sense, and
there is no reason grounded in constitutional text or values why it should.
One might draw the conclusion that courts should simply abandon the
doctrine and apply strict scrutiny to those kinds of regulations that are
currently covered by it. This would mean, in essence, holding most adult
business zoning regulations to be unconstitutional. This proposal, howev-
er, would be disruptive and harmful, with little benefit to the free speech
marketplace. It would not only call into question over thirty years of set-
tled expectations in the area of land use planning, but it would actually
give a level of protection to pornography that has never existed at any time
under the Constitution. Recall that the Supreme Court decided Young only
a few years after the Court first began to apply heightened scrutiny to con-
tent-based regulations.'34 Young also came uncoincidentally after a line of
decisions significantly narrowing the constitutional definition of obsceni-
ty.' 35 Understood in its historical context, Young was not a break from the
past; it was simply a decision marking the outer boundaries of two new
developments in constitutional law that otherwise would have required
extreme results. If the Supreme Court should consider overruling the sec-
ondary effects doctrine of Young, it might as well reconsider the presump-
tion against content discrimination stated in Mosley or the narrow defmi-
tion of obscenity stated in Miller v. California, all of which came about
together.
Moreover, time has only strengthened the Supreme Court's acceptance
of the secondary effects doctrine as applied to adult business regulations.
While the Supreme Court decided Young by a 5-4 vote,' 36 in Renton the
134. See supra Part I.B.
135. See supra Part I.A.
136. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (describing votes).
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vote was 7-2,37 and more recently in Alameda Books the Supreme Court
unanimously approved the central holding of Young and Renton that adult
business regulations aimed at secondary effects receive intermediate scru-
tiny.' 38 In fact, Justices Brennan and Marshall were the last Justices on the
Court to disagree with the general methodology of Young and Renton.13 9
By contrast, Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter, who today are among
those Justices most inclined to protect pornography, have all three au-
thored opinions explaining why this methodology does not offend First
Amendment values.'40 Fears that secondary effects reasoning would justify
regulations beyond those affecting sexually explicit speech have not mate-
rialized. And any fear that secondary effects regulations would effectively
drive sexually explicit speech out of the marketplace of ideas certainly has
not come to pass. Thus, while the idea that adult business regulations
aimed at secondary effects should receive strict scrutiny may be popular in
some academic circles, it is an idea that is losing traction. This has never
been the law and seems increasingly unlikely ever to become the law.
Suppose that we take the modern secondary effects doctrine as a giv-
en, and that we recognize it as designed for pornography and sexually
explicit entertainment. As shown earlier, the Supreme Court has only ever
used the doctrine to justify regulations of sexually explicit speech, despite
many opportunities to apply it in other areas according to the same prin-
ciples of causation. In other courts, the pattern is the same: seldom does
the doctrine make any difference other than in cases involving pornogra-
phy or sexual entertainment. 4' Courts seem intuitively to understand that
137. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 42 (1986) (describing votes).
Although Justice Blackmun dissented in Young, he concurred in the result in Renton. See id. at 55.
138. Although members of the Court disagreed in Alameda Books over the application of interme-
diate scrutiny to the ordinance in question, all nine Justices nonetheless wrote or joined opinions citing
Renton with approval and agreeing that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard because the
ordinance focused on secondary effects. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425,
432-43 (2002) (plurality opinion); id. at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 444-49 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); id. at 453-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
139. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-38 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (criticizing the
Renton analysis); Renton, 475 U.S. at 55-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Both opinions were joined only
by Justice Marshall.
140. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 453-57 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 583-87 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring);
Young, 427 U.S. at 63-73 (Stevens, J., plurality).
141. According to a survey of federal and state cases reported in Westlaw ("ALLCASES" data-
base), in the years 2004-2006, the terms "secondary effect" or "secondary effects" appeared in 168
cases in the context of disputed First Amendment questions. Of these, 138 cases involved disputes
over sexually explicit speech, many of which upheld regulations similar to those in Young and Renton
on the basis of the secondary effects doctrine. By contrast, only 30 First Amendment cases referring to
"secondary effects" did not involve sexually explicit speech, and only 10 of these ultimately upheld the
regulations in question. (The others either rejected application of the secondary effects doctrine or
mentioned "secondary effects" in passing.) Moreover, in most of these ten cases, the reference to
secondary effects appears to be unnecessary to the analysis either because the law was content-neutral
on its face, e.g., Lee v. Katz, No. CV 00-310-PA, 2004 WL 1211921 (D. Or. June 2, 2004) (uphold-
ing a content-neutral restriction establishing free speech zones in a public plaza), involved speech
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the secondary effects doctrine is limited to this kind of speech. How does
this critique influence how we should interpret the secondary effects doc-
trine? I propose several lessons for First Amendment analysis that appear
from a strictly pornographic secondary effects doctrine.
A. Pornography Is Subject to Intermediate Protection
The first lesson of a revised secondary effects doctrine is that it is jus-
tified by the distinctive qualities of pornography and sexual entertainment.
Sometimes courts apply lower scrutiny in a case because the class of
speech raises a built-in legitimate justification for government to impose
content-based regulation. We already recognize this about commercial
speech regulations,"' and it would be helpfil for courts to recognize it
about sexually oriented business regulations. If the secondary effects cases
are correctly decided, then Justice Stevens was right in Young: porno-
graphic speech is subject to a distinctive form of constitutional protec-
tion-while government may not ban it altogether, content-based regula-
tions of pornography do not always require strict scrutiny.143
Indeed, there are close parallels between commercial speech and por-
nography. Like commercial speech, pornography was historically unders-
tood to be outside the scope of First Amendment protection altogether."
Like commercial speech, there are strong market forces that support the
continued presence of pornography, making it "a hardy breed of expres-
sion that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad
regulation." 145 And like unregulated commercial speech, unregulated por-
nography causes distinctive harms. In the case of commercial speech, its
potential for misleading or defrauding consumers gives government a con-
tent-based reason for regulating it. 146 In the case of pornography, its ability
to cause neighborhood blight and crime, and its tendency to intrude upon
the privacy of the home in a particularly invasive way, are among those
reasons that can justify content-based regulations. While these effects all
flow from the communicative elements of speech, it also matters that these
subject to diminished protection, e.g., Salib v. City of Mesa, 133 P.3d 756 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)
(upholding a restriction on the size of signs as applied to commercial speech), or for other reasons.
142. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-66
(1980).
143. Granted, there are some Supreme Court cases that do apply strict scrutiny to pornography
regulations. See supra notes 108-110. Thus, the analogy to commercial speech is not perfect, at least
not as a description of current law.
144. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding commercial speech unpro-
tected), abrogated by Va. State Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976); see also supra Part L.A (explaining the historical breadth of obscenity law).
145. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).
146. See id. at 562-63.
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harms affect innocent people and are capable of reduction through modest
content-based regulations.
The case for giving pornography reduced constitutional protection
seems even stronger than for commercial speech when comparing the in-
formational value of each. Commercial speech serves the obvious purpose
of informing consumers about available products and services in all facets
of commercial life. It serves the knowledge-seeking function of the First
Amendment directly, and it is absolutely essential to the functioning of a
free market. By contrast, pornography is not typically designed for either
informational or persuasive value; to the extent it provides either, this
effect is incidental. Pornography often does not even claim artistic or lite-
rary value (although sometimes these claims are made), but rather typical-
ly panders to its target audience for the sole purpose of sexual arousal. As
some commentators have noted, pornography has more in common with a
sexual device-which is not speech-then it has with cognitive speech. 147
This is not to say that pornography has no potential communicative
value whatsoever. Undoubtedly, some would find artistic, informational,
or political value in even the most explicit and raw forms of pornogra-
phy.'48 It can also be difficult to distinguish gratuitous pornography which
merely panders to prurient interests from works of more serious artistic,
literary, or scientific value. Thus, current law makes the reasonable choice
to protect a good deal of low-minded sexual expression to give breathing
room to higher-value expression on sexual subjects. The Supreme Court's
decisions defining obscenity narrowly reflect this caution and the tendency
to give the benefit of the doubt to free expression.
But it does not follow that all sexual expression deserves the same lev-
el of constitutional protection as any other speech, or that it has the same
predicted value. 149 Judicial caution does not require courts to abandon all
147. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech "-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise
in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 922 (1979) (noting the same
proposition); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 612-17
(noting that pornography differs from high-value speech in that it functions primarily as an aid to
masturbation, and not as a cognitive expression).
148. David Cole, Playing By Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U.
PA. L. Rev. 111, 122-27 (1994) (arguing that the distinction between sexual expression and high-
value expression is improper and underestimates the value of sexual expression).
149. In a Seventh Circuit en banc case, Judge Easterbook, in a dissenting opinion, responded to a
similar logical leap in the argument of a nude dance club:
If the First Amendment protects [nudity in painting and opera], the argument goes, Joe Six-
pack is entitled to see naked women gyrate in the pub. Why does this follow? That a dance
in Salome expresses something does not imply that a dance in JR's Kitty Kat Lounge ex-
presses something, any more than the fact that Tolstoy's Anna Karenina was a stinging at-
tack on the Russian social order implies that the scratching of an illiterate is likely to un-
dermine the Tsar.
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). While Judge Easterbrook wrote this in dissent, his position prevailed when the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991),
[Vol. 60:2:291
Pornographic Secondary Effects
sense of speech's constitutional value. Just as the law treats some utter-
ances as constitutionally unprotected because of their apparent lack of any
constitutional value,15° it is rational to treat some forms of sexual expres-
sion as subject to qualified constitutional protection. For pornographic
speech that has remote First Amendment value at best, causes distinct
harm, and has strong commercial interests supporting it, there is little rea-
son to disfavor all regulation of it. In the adult business setting, interme-
diate-level scrutiny is likely to provide sufficient protection to society's
interest in advancing knowledge and culture through speech. 151
Thus, while First Amendment law operates cautiously in giving some
constitutional protection to pornography and sexual entertainment, it treats
this as a distinct class of expression having less protection than political,
scientific, or religious speech. It is, as some Justices have said of nude
dancing, at the "outer ambit" of First Amendment protection.152 This is
the only reasonable way to explain why the secondary effects doctrine
applies essentially only to adult business regulations. It is also the only
way to explain several other legal principles affecting the time, place, and
manner of sexually explicit speech, including the FCC's indecency doc-
trine, 153 postal service rules against mailing pornography to unwilling
homeowners, 154 rules allowing cable television operators to regulate por-
nography, 5 5 the requirement of pornography filters at public library inter-
net stations, 156 certain anti-spam rules focused on pornography, 157 and the
role of sexual harassment law in regulating pornography in the
workplace. 151
Recognizing pornography as a distinctive category of speech serves
not only to explain these content-based doctrines, but it also prevents their
being used to support broader regulations of higher value speech. Confus-
upholding the city's regulation.
150. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 n.22 (1984).
151. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of audience-based theories of the First Amendment.
152. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion) (nude dancing "falls
only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection"); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (plurality
opinion) (nude dancing is "within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as
only marginally so"); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(describing pornography as having low First Amendment value and diminished protection); see also
Miller, 904 F.2d at 1130 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (writing of nude dancing, "someone standing at
the center of the First Amendment (political speech) would need binoculars to see this far into the
periphery").
153. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
154. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
155. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
156. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
157. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act
of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006).
158. See, e.g., Coniglio v. City of Berwyn, No. 99 C 4475, 1999 WL 1212190 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16,
1999) (finding that plaintiff stated a valid claim under Title VII for hostile work environment based on
an employee's pervasive pornography use).
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ing pornography as fully protected speech is actually a threat to First
Amendment values because it could cause the accepted constitutional rules
of pornography to spill into other areas.
B. Content-Based Regulations Are Sometimes Preferable
A second lesson of the secondary effects doctrine has broader signific-
ance. It is that content-based regulations are not always harmful to First
Amendment values, and sometimes they are even preferable to content-
neutral alternatives. This is an important observation for First Amendment
theory given how frequently courts and commentators describe content
discrimination as "[t]he essence of this forbidden censorship.' ' 159 Justice
Stevens was correct in Young, at least as a descriptive matter, when he
explained that the rhetoric of disfavoring content discrimination is exagge-
rated.160
We should recognize that adult business regulations such as those
upheld in Young and Renton are content-based both in form and in pur-
pose. They are content-based in form because they classify media busi-
nesses according to what is printed or depicted. They are content-based in
purpose because they target consequences that arise-according to the only
rational basis for such regulations-from the communicative effects of
sexually explicit speech,16' even if the effects are remote in the chain of
causation. The government's motives and means may be legitimate, but
this does not make them content-neutral.
If cases upholding these regulations are correctly decided, it is an in-
dication that content-neutrality is not the primary goal of First Amendment
law. Rather, it is a means of achieving public welfare through speech, and
as such can be overruled by cost-benefit considerations.162 Cities claim
that adult businesses tend to cause lower property values and crime in the
areas where they locate.163 If regulation can reduce this harm by prohibit-
ing adult businesses in some zones, while still allowing them ample places
to exist elsewhere, it is possible to achieve a net clear benefit for society.
Tangible harm is avoided, while the speech is largely preserved for speak-
159. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1971).
160. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-70 (1976) (describing examples of
permissible content discrimination and how the Court's statements against content discrimination in
Mosley should be confined to context).
161. See supra Part II.C.
162. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54
STAN. L. REv. 737 (2002) (defending the role of cost-benefit analysis in resolving First Amendment
problems).
163. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 430 (2002); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986); Young, 427 U.S. at 55. For a collection of stu-
dies supporting this claim, see Community Defense Counsel: Secondary Effects,
http://www.communitydefense.org/lawlibrary/secondaryeffect.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
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ers and audiences who value it."6 This may not leave all speech equal un-
der the law, but it does have the potential to improve social welfare.
What is more, the secondary effects cases indicate that content-based
regulations are sometimes preferable to content-neutral alternatives for a
system that highly values speech. Had Young been decided differently,
cities would still have the option of responding to the problems of adult
businesses through content-neutral regulations. For example, they might
choose to prohibit all media outlets, movie theaters, and entertainment
businesses in protected zones, regardless of the content of their works.
This approach, however, would burden large quantities of speech that
have no causal connection to the harm in question. It would make little
sense on the authority of the First Amendment to require government to
restrict speech that does not cause harm.'65 Rigid adherence to the ideal of
content-neutrality is not constitutionally required and can even contradict
another constitutional norm: the principle that regulations of speech should
be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives. Sometimes, only a con-
tent-based regulation serves the government interest in question without
regulating more speech than necessary.
For those who claim that the freedom of speech is, at its most funda-
mental level, a right to have one's speech treated no worse than anyone
else's speech under the law,"6 the secondary effects cases present difficul-
ty. If that were the essence of the freedom of speech, adult business regu-
lations should be per se unconstitutional. Instead, the secondary effects
doctrine fits comfortably within the pattern of other First Amendment doc-
trines that allow content discrimination in some settings,167 some of which
reflect content-based choices in the very structure of First Amendment
law,'68 and that appear to be the product of offsetting costs and benefits
associated with specific categories of speech. 69
164. This assumes the primary purpose of the First Amendment is to provide value to audiences
and speakers, which is satisfied by a requirement that government not overregulate. If the dominant
interest of the Speech and Press Clauses were ensuring that government treats all speech equally, or
that it should be indifferent to consequences of communication, then the secondary effects doctrine
should not exist.
165. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 (plurality opinion) (noting the city's finding that the negative
effects of sexually oriented theaters are not attributable to theaters showing other types of films).
166. E.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free
Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993); Kagan, supra note 6; Rubenfeld, supra note 126. Of
course, commentators supporting this idea could argue that the secondary effects cases were wrongly
decided, and some of them do. At the least, however, it becomes difficult for commentators to rely
solely on Supreme Court authority, as established in cases such as Police Department v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1971), for the proposition that content-discrimination is inherently wrong or unconstitutional
when there exists other Supreme Court authority in contradiction to this idea.
167. See Fee, supra note 3, at 1136-38 (exploring the various exceptions to the First Amendment's
rule against content discrimination).
168. Id. at 1146-47 (discussing categories of low-value/high-harm speech in First Amendment
law).
169. The famous quote from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), captures this
20091
Alabama Law Review
Of course, the suggestion that cost-benefit analysis explains some
areas of First Amendment law does not mean that courts do, or even
should, approach every free speech case as a fresh balancing question. In
interpreting the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has established a
variety of doctrinal rules and standards to ensure consistency and to tip the
scales in favor of allowing free speech. This includes the general presump-
tion against content discrimination that applies to many areas of govern-
mental regulation.170 As to be expected, established First Amendment doc-
trines sometimes direct courts to find seemingly harmless and potentially
beneficial regulations to be unconstitutional as a precaution against short-
sightedness. But the doctrines themselves, including those regarding con-
tent discrimination, still appear to be products of judicial cost-benefit
analysis.17' Granted, the First Amendment requires caution before ever
concluding that the value of regulation outweighs the value of unregulated
free speech, but the level of appropriate caution may vary depending on
the type of speech and the context of the regulation. The secondary effects
doctrine marks one area where the potential benefits of content-based
regulation are likely to be so strong, and the corresponding threat to
speaker and audience interests so minor, that intermediate scrutiny pro-
vides the appropriate level of protection.
C. Legislative Purpose and the Anti-Proportionality Principle
The secondary effects doctrine also raises a potential lesson regarding
the role of legislative purpose in constitutional law. It is that legislative
motive can serve as an indicator of whether a speech regulation is rational-
ly consistent with the speech's status as constitutionally protected. It does
this by focusing not simply on the objective of a regulation, but also on its
intended means of achieving that objective.
According to the secondary effects doctrine, legislative purpose affects
the level of constitutional scrutiny. A government regulation of sexually
oriented businesses is subject to intermediate scrutiny only if designed for
the predominate purpose of controlling secondary effects, and not for the
purpose of inhibiting speech that the government disagrees with. 72 While
notion: "It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id. at 572.
170. See Fee, supra note 3, at 1157-66 (exploring how the presumption against allowing content-
based regulation serves to deter overregulation of speech without usurping the role of elected branches
of government).
171. See, e.g., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007) (explaining that
content discrimination is a problem when it "raises the specter that the Government may effectively
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace" and that there are "numerous situations in
which that risk is inconsequential, so that strict scrutiny is unwarranted").
172. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986). This stands in tension
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it might not be fully clear what the phrase "secondary effects" means,"'
we can suppose that a regulation based on traditional moral objections or
feminist objections to pornography, for example, would not qualify under
this doctrine. These purposes seem to reflect direct disagreement with
pornography's message, which the Court's secondary effects cases expli-
citly distinguish. 74 Even though a regulation based on these goals might
have the same practical effect on sexually explicit speech as a standard
adult business ordinance, it would be subject to strict scrutiny.'75 Why
should this be so?
One answer might be that courts simply find some policy reasons for
regulating speech to be more compelling than others. For example, some
judges might consider moral or feminist objections to pornography to be
irrational, while believing that protecting a neighborhood from the deteri-
orating effects of adult businesses carries more weight. This explanation
seems inadequate, however, because the Supreme Court has conspicuously
avoided disagreeing on the merits with those who find speech objectiona-
ble because of its direct communicative impact. 76 Rather than treat these
kinds of objections as irrational or flimsy, courts treat them as improper in
the context of government regulation of protected speech.177 Something
more must explain why certain kinds of governmental purposes are prefer-
able to others.
A more persuasive answer lies in what we might call the anti-
proportionality principle. Justice Kennedy refers to this in his concurring
opinion in Alameda Books.178 The principle correlates in some cases with
with the Supreme Court's famous statement in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), that
"this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative motive." Id. at 383.
173. See supra Part II.
174. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49 ("The ordinance does not contravene the fundamental
principle ... that government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds accept-
able, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views." (internal
quotations omitted)).
175. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986) (holding unconstitutional under strict scrutiny a law aimed at controlling pornogra-
phy's gender message).
176. For example, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000),
the Court wrote the following, while striking down a pornography regulation:
When a student first encounters our free speech jurisprudence, he or she might think it is
influenced by the philosophy that one idea is as good as any other, and that in art and litera-
ture objective standards of style, taste, decorum, beauty, and esthetics are deemed by the
Constitution to be inappropriate, indeed unattainable. Quite the opposite is true. The Con-
stitution no more enforces a relativistic philosophy or moral nihilism than it does any other
point of view. The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including
esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed.
What the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for
the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.
Id. at 818.
177. See id.
178. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 450-51 (2002) (Kennedy, J., con-
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the distinction between remote and immediate effects, and may roughly
explain the phrasing of the secondary effects doctrine, but the correlation
does not fit every case. The anti-proportionality principle aligns more
closely to First Amendment normative interests than the distinction be-
tween remote and immediate effects, and so provides a stronger basis for
explaining why courts sometimes look at motive in determining the level
of scrutiny.
According to the anti-proportionality principle, intermediate scrutiny
should apply to a regulation only if the regulatory benefit can be achieved
without reducing the quantity of speech proportionally to the benefit in
question. In other words, if a regulatory benefit depends upon suppressing
speech, such that the desired benefit is directly proportional to the chilling
effect of the regulation, then strict scrutiny should apply, even if the regu-
lation is only a partial restriction. On the other hand, if the intended bene-
fit does not depend upon reducing the quantity of speech, but merely de-
pends on changing the circumstances of its delivery, so that it is possible
to achieve a significant benefit without burdening speech to the same ex-
tent, then intermediate scrutiny is generally appropriate.
How is it possible for a regulation to reduce harms that arise from the
communicative effects of speech and yet satisfy the anti-proportionality
principle? It is possible if the targeted harm arises from multiple causal
factors. For example, adult businesses might cause harm through the com-
bination of (1) the communicative effects of sexually explicit speech, and
(2) the location or context of the speech. By regulating the location or con-
text of the speech, it is sometimes possible to reduce certain negative
communicative effects of speech without changing its content or volume,
in the same way that it is possible to reduce harms that arise from the
smell of a pig farm by changing its location (and without changing its
smelliness) to a place where the smell does not interact negatively with its
surroundings.
The anti-proportionality principle makes sense within a cost-benefit
framework that is suspicious of bans on speech. If the speech in question
is protected by the First Amendment, we might presume that the benefits
of banning the speech do not outweigh the potential costs in terms of
speech-chilling effects. If this is true, then it must also be true that any
regulatory burden (even a slight one) does not outweigh the regulatory
benefit if the benefit is directly proportional to the speech-suppression
effect. Any fraction of a negative number is still a negative number. On
the other hand, if the net benefit of partially burdening the speech is posi-
tive, and arises directly from the regulation's effectiveness in suppressing
speech, then logically the government should ban the speech entirely. It is
curring).
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therefore only rational to regulate speech on the basis of content-without
fully banning the speech-where the regulatory benefit is disproportionate
to the speech-suppression effect, and that can only happen where the harm
bears a certain kind of relationship to the speech in question. Focusing on
legislative purpose in secondary effects cases may serve to identify if that
relationship exists.
A regulation of adult businesses that is based on moral or feminist ob-
jections to pornography would not satisfy the anti-proportionality prin-
ciple, even assuming that those objections have substantial merit.'79 A reg-
ulation can serve those interests only by deterring pornography's message
generally-either by deterring suppliers or by deterring consumers and
viewers-so its effectiveness will be directly proportional to its message-
burdening effect. This means that the cost-benefit analysis of such a regu-
lation will yield the same answer as to whether a total ban of such material
should be allowed. If the Supreme Court has already held that banning this
kind of speech is unconstitutional, then any law with a regulatory purpose
that logically supports a total ban should be treated in the same manner.
Moral or feminist objections to pornography may be relevant to whether
the material should be protected at all (which raises the question of how to
define obscenity), 8 ° but they cannot rationally support a partial regulation
of speech that is correctly held to be protected.
Ultimately, the anti-proportionality principle is not a pure purpose test
but is an effects test. It helps courts make sure that government does not
overregulate protected speech. It makes sense, however, for courts to con-
sider legislative purpose in predicting the effects of a law, especially if
deference to legislative judgment is part of the equation.' 8 ' A regulation
designed for a purpose that is consistent with the anti-proportionality prin-
ciple is more likely to have such an effect, and so it is reasonable for
courts to treat these laws less suspiciously. Intermediate scrutiny may be
sufficient to ensure that the regulation will have the intended effect and is
not overbroad.
The anti-proportionality principle may not be the only explanation for
the secondary effects doctrine and its focus on legislative purpose. But it is
at least one explanation that correlates with the goal of preserving valuable
speech while controlling its harm. It also provides a way for courts to in-
terpret-or preferably avoid-the ambiguous phrase "secondary effects."
179. For an overview of feminist arguments against pornography and obscenity, see generally
Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and Harm: Why Miller Should Survive Lawrence,
15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 611 (2008).
180. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-62 (1973) (discussing the moral and
aesthetic basis for obscenity law); Dionne, supra note 179 (discussing feminist arguments for preserv-
ing obscenity law).
181. See Kagan, supra note 6, at 507-10 (explaining how a motive-based First Amendment can
make sense for consequentialist reasons).
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If courts would apply the anti-proportionality principle explicitly, rather
than ask whether the effects are secondary, the law would be clearer and
more visibly designed to achieve a rational balance of the goals of regula-
tion and freedom of speech.
V. EXAMPLE APPLICATION: INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY ZONING
This part will briefly explore an example of how a functional under-
standing of the secondary effects doctrine can inform First Amendment
problems beyond its usual area of application. While the secondary effects
doctrine provides lessons for speech regulation generally, let us consider
an example involving sexually explicit speech in a different context than
the neighborhood adult business.
Suppose that Congress passes a law that creates something like zoning
on the internet for sexually explicit content. 182 The general purpose of the
law would be to facilitate private choices of internet subscribers who do
not want pornography to be available on their networks. More specifical-
ly, the regulatory goals would include: helping parents to protect minors
from pornography, helping employers to create work environments that
are professional and free of offense, and helping employers preserve
workplace productivity.183
Of course, private filtering software can accomplish some of this
without a system of regulation.' But there are limitations to filters, and
one of them is that it is difficult to identify sites with objectionable con-
tent. For this reason, some have proposed laws that would require internet
publishers of sexually explicit content to publish their content in a manner
that would enable private filtering methods to work more effectively.
These proposals include the requirement to use a ".xxx" top level domain,
or a special channel for pornographic content.185 Such laws would allow
explicit content to exist on the internet for those who choose to access it,
but would require affirmative action by those who publish such material to
do so in the required manner. Internet publishers of sexually explicit ma-
terial would likely object to such a law, not only because it could require
some extra effort on their part, but it could reduce the size of their au-
diences if the system works.
182. For an overview of options, see Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to
Protecting Children Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1417.
183. See id. at 1437 (citing these interests in support of internet zoning).
184. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667-70 (2004) (discussing filters as an alternative to
regulation for the protection of minors).
185. See Preston, supra note 182, at 1490; see also Cheryl B. Preston, The Internet Commnity
Ports Act of 2007, www.cp80.org/resources/0000/00l3/InternetCommunityPorts_Act.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4, 2009).
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Should a court apply strict scrutiny to such a law? 186 Formal applica-
tion of the secondary effects doctrine provides no principled answer to the
problem. The law would serve a variety of purposes, some of which seem
to qualify as secondary in the sense of being remote in the chain of causa-
tion. For example, one might identify lost workplace productivity as a
secondary effect of pornography because it is removed in the chain of cau-
sation and does not depend on disagreement with the speaker's message.
But as explained earlier, remote causation is not always a sufficient reason
to apply relaxed scrutiny,' 87 and this might not be the law's only purpose.
It would seem silly to allow government to regulate pornography for the
reason of protecting workplace productivity, but not for purposes of pro-
tecting children, especially if one could show that pornography has ad-
verse effects on children, which could later produce other negative effects
for society.188
Equally unsatisfying is the argument that strict scrutiny should apply
because the legislation aims at the communicative effects of speech. This
may be true, but it does not convincingly distinguish Young, Renton, and
Alameda Books, all of which upheld laws designed to control the down-
stream effects of pornography's communicative effects in a particular en-
vironment. '89 Formal application of the secondary effects doctrine does not
yield a clear or principled answer to this problem, precisely because courts
have not used the phrase secondary effects consistently.
Applying the lessons suggested in this Article, one might instead ana-
lyze the problem less formalistically and focus on whether the law would
affect publishers and audiences in a way that should require a high level of
caution. In other words, Does the law have features indicating that it
would likely impose an unreasonable danger to the marketplace of ideas in
186. For purposes of this analysis, assume that the law defines regulated material in terms clear
enough to avoid vagueness problems. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 58-
61 (1976) (upholding Detroit's adult business ordinance against vagueness challenge).
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. Some might argue that this analysis contradicts what the Supreme Court has already held in
the area of internet pornography-namely that content-based regulations designed for the protection of
minors are subject to strict scrutiny. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (upholding a pre-
liminary injunction against the Child Online Protection Act); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(holding the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional). But while the analysis of some pornogra-
phy cases differs from the functional approach suggested here, neither the outcome of those cases nor
the choice to apply strict scrutiny conflicts with this interpretation of the secondary effects doctrine,
which recommends strict scrutiny in appropriate cases. For example, the statutes in both Reno and
Ashcroft imposed relatively significant burdens on protected communication, and for this reason alone
may have justified heightened scrutiny. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874-77; see also ACLU v. Gonzales,
478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 813-20 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (describing the significant chilling effects of the Child
Online Protection Act). Moreover, other Supreme Court cases affecting pornography contradict the
notion that any regulation of sexual expression designed to control communicative effects requires
strict scrutiny. See supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text. A central thesis of this Article is that
something other than simple reference to "primary impact" or "secondary impact" must explain the
distinction between these lines of cases.
189. See supra Part H.C.
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relation to the interests that support it? If the secondary effects doctrine is
a function of asking this broader question, then it is helpful to refer to that
question in determining the scope of the doctrine. With this inquiry in
mind, there are several sub-issues that one should examine.
The Category of Speech Regulated. First, one should look closely at
the regulatory definition of the speech subject to restriction. If the regula-
tion is written to encompass essentially only low-value pornographic
speech-even though it may cover more than that which is legally ob-
scene-then intermediate scrutiny may be appropriate (subject to other
issues discussed below) because such speech has diminished First
Amendment protection."9 As Justice Stevens pointed out in Young, porno-
graphy does not have the same constitutional status as political speech,
even though it has some First Amendment protection.19' If, however, the
regulation is written in a manner that is overbroad, or fails to exempt
works of more significant constitutional value, strict scrutiny should apply.
The Interests Served by the Ordinance. Second, one should consider
whether the interests served by the law are significant enough to warrant
regulating speech on the basis of content, as well as whether the law
would likely serve those interests effectively. In this case, facilitating pri-
vate choice and protecting minors appear to be relatively strong inter-
ests,19 but there may be questions about the effectiveness of the law. This
may involve exploring the technology and its potential loopholes, as well
as the problem of international web publishing.'93 Granted, a full explora-
tion of the government's interest and the law's effectiveness might await
the application of strict or intermediate scrutiny, whichever is appropriate,
but it is worth taking a preliminary look at these issues in deciding which
level of scrutiny to apply.
The Burden on Protected Speech. Third, one should ask whether the
ordinance would likely impose a significant burden on publishers of por-
nography and internet users. In this case, the burden on pornography pub-
lishers might be significant or slight, depending on the nature of the regu-
latory requirement. The fact that many publishers would prefer not to
identify their work as pornographic, for example by attaching ".xxx" to
the domain name, could create chilling effects. On the other hand, if the
identification is essentially invisible to internet users who do not filter, a
regulatory requirement of marking sexually explicit material in a manner
that allows filters to work might be more acceptable.
190. See supra Part IV.A.
191. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
192. Cf. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding postal regulation of
indecent materials triggered by homeowner choice).
193. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667 (noting the Child Online Protection Act's inability to control
overseas publishing as a factor against its effectiveness).
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The Anti-Proportionality Principle. Finally, one should ask whether
the law is designed for a purpose that is consistent with the speech's con-
stitutionally protected status. This means that the regulatory benefit should
be one that does not depend on reducing the quantity or accessibility of
protected speech for those who have a right to access it, and any such ef-
fect should be slight and incidental in comparison to the law's legitimate
effect. In the case of an internet zoning regulation, this analysis may de-
pend on whether courts consider there to be any constitutional significance
to an employee's or child's desire to access protected internet speech in
violation of the computer owner's wishes. If this is a protected form of
communication, then an internet zoning regulation as described would
violate the anti-proportionality principle because its primary effect would
be to prevent this. But if the computer owner/internet subscriber's proper-
ty interest trumps the First Amendment interests of end-users (and pub-
lishers who communicate with those end-users), and if the law does not
curtail the choices of internet subscribers, then the internet zoning law
would likely satisfy this criterion. Its intended effect is likely to be highly
disproportionate to any burden on lawful, legitimate communication.
If the internet zoning law fails any of the steps of this analysis, then it
is proper to treat it under strict scrutiny for the usual reasons that the law
disfavors content-based regulations. But if it meets all of these criteria,
there appears to be no principled reason for treating it differently than the
adult business regulations upheld in Young and Renton. The kind of defe-
rence applicable to adult business zoning regulations should apply.
At least this is one way to apply the lessons of the secondary effects
doctrine. To be sure, the framework does not provide a bright-line rule.
Reasonable minds could disagree over what criteria to apply, and how to
apply them in particular cases, just as judges commonly disagree over the
application of strict or intermediate scrutiny. But we should recognize that
the formal version of the secondary effects doctrine also fails to provide a
bright-line rule, despite its having the appearance of a rule. At least a
functional secondary effects doctrine focuses on criteria rooted in constitu-
tional policy rather than word games.
CONCLUSION
The secondary effects doctrine is among the least understood of First
Amendment principles, both as to its theory and practical implications.
The Supreme Court is largely to blame for this, having failed to explain
what is meant by a secondary effect or why this should matter for constitu-
tional purposes. The Court has not even clearly settled whether the doc-
trine is an application of the general rule against content discrimination or
an exception to that rule, or whether the doctrine is limited to pornography
and sexual entertainment. This befuddlement has caused scholars to see
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the doctrine as illegitimate, as it appears on the surface to conflict with
basic First Amendment principles disfavoring content discrimination. Yet
at the same time, the doctrine seems to enjoy greater judicial acceptance
than ever before, it is the basis of local land use laws throughout the na-
tion, and it is applied in dozens of reported cases every year.194 It is not
going to disappear any time soon.
This Article aims to re-evaluate the secondary effects doctrine in a
way that is more transparent. The real secondary effects doctrine has little
to do with the term secondary and has everything to do with the content of
sexually explicit speech. This does not mean that those who would regu-
late sexually explicit speech are morally opposed to its existence, but they
do object to some of its negative effects. Appreciating the functional basis
of the secondary effects doctrine is necessary for understanding the doc-
trine's limitations and reach. It also provides insights for general First
Amendment application, including how cost-benefit analysis affects the
constitutional rules regarding content discrimination and how the purpose
of a regulation affects the level of scrutiny that courts apply.
194. See supra note 141.
[Vol. 60:2:291338
